Understanding the Khotan violence in the Local Context: 街道办事处

Understanding the Khotan violence in the Local Context

After the July 5th event in Xinjiang, the recent Khotan attack is another open confrontation between some Uyghurs and the Chinese police in Khotan city. There are basically two interpretations of this event: (1) the WUC headed Uyghur organizations claims that this incident is resulted from Chinese police fired at a peaceful Uyghur demonstration; (2) the Chinese authority states that this is a “serious” terrorist attack, rhetoric familiar to China watchers and Islam scholars.

No more “ism,” but Neighborhood Committee
The two narratives presented by the Uyghur organizations and the Chinese state-media simply express two isms that characterize the event: one is democracy and the other is terrorism. According to sources available now, what seems to be sure is that the attackers are bearded young people from either Kashgar or Aksu or both with limited Chinese language ability. In other words, the attackers are vagrants and illiterate in Chinese. It is better to start analyzing this event by thinking the word “vagrant” here. Why are the Uyghurs from outside Khotan called vagrant in Xinjiang? The word “vagrant” in this context expresses negative connotation, meaning some Uyghurs’ presence in Khotan is illegal, which in turn indicates tight control by the local police of the movement of the individual Uyghurs in Xinjiang. To blame the outsiders to ignite the violence began to form a general pattern among China’s “anti-terror experts” to explain the violence committed by the Uyghurs, as clearly seen after the July 5th event.

Unlike other terrorists who selected high-value targets such as NYC or Mumbai, these Khotan “terrorists” strangely attacked a local police station in a remote oasis city. Why local police station? Xinjiangreview has presented the stated duties of local law enforcement offices in Xinjiang (as exemplified by a Neighborhood Committee in Kashgar, see article on Xinjiangreview, “Ten Duties of A Neighborhood Committee”) (interesting, the so-called police stationed attacked is actually a Neighborhood Committee 纳尔巴格街道办事处). These duties and power range from population registration/ID check to passport application control. Since Khotan is a smaller city compared to Kashgar, the duties of a police station primarily include the duties of a neighborhood committee in Kashgar. This analyst is not interesting in seeing how many open or hidden duties a police station carries on in Khotan. It is curious to ask how does a police station handle the violator of the state, provincial, and local regulations?

For people living in northwest China, not to mention Xinjiang or Tibet, the corruption of a police station is an open secret. Guanxi, bribe, fine, dinner, and other forms of money-making and friend-making define, interpret, and implement the laws at local level. For local police, the more trouble-makers they identify and arrest, the more fine and ransom they earn. To northwest minority population, it is not surprising that the local police station is attacked.

People may wonder how could a local police station in northwest China (esp Xinjiang) committee corruption to such a degree as to act as a black society? The answer is that the police station masters political economy — they excel at how and when to deploy even develop “sensitive” issues such as the so-called three forces of “terrorism” “extremism” and “separatism” to enrich themselves by exploiting the locals on the one hand and by applying funding from the state on the other. This corruption pattern not only fits the local police station in Xinjiang, it actually fits China’s all interest groups in Xinjiang who have a share in the so-called anti-“three evil forces” campaign, ranging from project/funding-minded academics to fine-collecting police to CCP’s central committee membership contending politicians. The Khotan incident indicates that the attackers targets what they are familiar with and, therefore, hate most, the Chinese police station. It is not a high-value target or symbolical marker and certainly does not represent an ideological ambition, be it terrorism or extremism.

Neighborhood Committee: to serve people or to suppress people?
China economists have familiar with the three divisions of China’s economic zone in terms of economic development, namely, the developed coastal/east China, developing central China, and under-developed northwest China. However, there is no discussion on the division of political zones in China at all. From a perspective of law enforcement and degree of liberty, democracy, and freedom, there are many divisions of political zones in China: Han/nonHan coastal (east) China, Han central China, non-Han central China, Han northwest, non-Han northwest, Han Xinjiang, Uyghur Xinjiang, Han Tibet, non-Han Tibet, and etc.

Citizen rights that people have enjoyed in contemporary China are different depending on their location and ethnicity. The area where the differentiated treatment of China’s citizenship is mostly reflected is the passport control. This is because in the context of globalization, more and more China’s citizens, be them Han or non-Han, tend to go abroad for various reasons. For Muslims, Uyghur, Hui, and others, passport is necessary to make a Hajj possible, one of the five pillars of their religion. By China’s constitution and laws, all citizens residing in China in theory should have equal access to the passport except the convicted. In reality, however, in Beijing, one can obtain one’s passport within 7 work days or 1 week; in central China, one may obtain one’s passport from 2 weeks to 3 months, depending on one’s ethnicity and destiny; in northwest, one may get one’s passport from 1 to 6 months, depending on one’s ethnicity, Time (to avoid Hajj time), and destiny (to avoid Islamic countries); in Xinjiang, one may never get one’s passport as long as he/she is a Uyghur.

My (non-Han) friend’s parents from northwest China deposited ￥ 1000 to apply for passport even to visit my friend in the U.S. and the “deposit” is never returned. For those Muslims who have no guanxi and/or extra money for bribe, there is no hope to go abroad at all. In this context, one can understand the desperate psychology of common Muslims whose body movement has been tightly controlled by local police station. It seems that the violence in Xinjiang will never end as long as there is endless corruption among local police; although the violence of this kind is understood primarily in grand terms of ism, the nature of the conflict between the Uyghur and the “Han” (“state”) seems to be more materilistic and local than ideological and nationalistic.

A definition of 街道办事处, source: Wikipedia
街道办事处
维基百科，自由的百科全书
街道办事处，习惯上简称为街道办、街办等，是中国大陆地区的市辖区和不设区的市政府的派出机关[1]，“街道办事处”管辖区域称为“街道”，街道一般与乡和镇处同一行政区划层次（即属于乡级区划，副省级城市的街道办与县处同一行政区划层次）。根据民政部统计，截至2004年12月31日，中国大陆全境有街道5,904个[2]。
由于中国大陆地区城市化进程的加快，有很多县份相继设置街道作为行政区划单位，渐渐朝“市建制”转变。如2009年9月，湖南省长沙县撤销星沙镇，设立星沙、湘龙、泉塘3个街道办事处[3]；重庆丰都县设有名山街道办事处、山东高唐县设有鱼丘湖街道办事处、广东龙门县设有龙城街道办事处等。有些地级市的辖区的行政机构用“区办事处”来代替区政府职能，如广东东莞莞城区办事处、中山石岐区办事处等。此外，很多地区伴随经济快速增长，城市化进程加快，最具典型的为北京近郊乡镇，这些地区仍旧保留原来的乡镇建制，乡镇政府加挂“地区办事处”牌子，乡镇以下的区划单位以社区为主。

中华人民共和国
行政区划

省级行政区

省

自治区

直辖市

特别行政区

地级行政区

地区／盟（行政公署）

自治州

地级市

显示▼县级行政区
县／旗

自治县／自治旗

县级市

市辖区

特区

林区

显示▼乡级行政区
乡／苏木（人民政府）

民族乡／民族苏木（人民政府）

镇（人民政府）

街道（办事处）
县辖区／努图克（公所）

显示▼附：基层群众自治组织
行政村（村民委员会）/嘎查

社区（居民委员会）

▼

历年街道办事处的数量
1986年以来街道数量列表

年份 街道
1986年 5718
1994年 5372
1995年 5596
1996年 5565
1997年 5678
2000年 5902
2001年 5972
2002年 5516
2003年 5751
2004年 5904

Reflection on violence in Xinjiang: the July 5th Event Remembered

It has been two years since the occurrence of violence in Xinjiang’s capital city, Urumuqi. The victims include, but not limited to, the Uyghurs. Some Han, Hui, and other ethnic members are also suffered from this tragic event.

The most involved and affected groups are the majority populations in Xinjiang, namely, the Uyghurs and the Han. It is understandable that there are basically two narratives about the violence in Xinjiang. The first and dominant narrative comes from the Han, as narrated by the Chinese state, attributes the violence to the Uyghurs, specifically to what the Chinese state (Han) calls the three evil forces (terrorism, extremism, and separatism).

According to Chinese state sources suddenly released after the occurrence of the September 11th event in the U.S. in 2001, the ambiguous “Dong-tu” or “East Turkistan”(s) forces have committed a serious of terrorist acts including bus bombings in Beijing and Urumuqi. However, to the U.S., the Uyghur forces that are believed to have engaged in terrorism are exclusively pointed to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement or its various derivations (ETIM).

Interestingly enough, after the July 5th event, the Chinese government, although continuously accuses “Tu-Dong” (ETIM?) forces, specifies another group as the major actors in this violence. The new force or actor after the July 5th event, identified by China’s official media and academia is Yi-zha-bu-te (伊扎布特), or (Hizb) Tahrir, which can be directly translated as Islamic Liberation Party. The identification of Uyghur participants in the July 5th event with this group seems to be reported by a Uyghur reporter, Harat （海莱特）who himself was later on arrested and jailed in China. According to his assessment, there were several hundred Hizb Tahrir members in early 1990s in Xinjiang and this number reaches to more than 20, 000 today(http://www.zaobao.com/special/feature/pages/feature090727a.shtmlr).

It is probably according to this and other beliefs and assessment, China’s major scholars on Xinjiang tend to concentrate on Yi-zha-tu-te organization. University professors in Beijing, Nanjing, Lanzhou, and, of course, Urumuqi, began to deploy the new terminology to develop China’s own theory of anti-terrorism. According to some researchers, each Yi-zha-bu-te member suddenly received ￥ 3000 to 5000 in their bank account before the July 5th as the paycheck for their participation in the July 5th event.

In addition to these two forces, religious extremism and terrorism (ETIM or Hizb Tahrir), the Chinese government also accuses overseas Uyghurs, especially Ms. Rabir Kadeer, of igniting the violence. The major evidence of alleged Ms. Kadeer’s participation in the July 5th event is her phone call to his relatives before the July 5th that, according to Chinese media, she informed her relatives that something would happen soon. This “evidence” was supposedly reinforced by the later confessions of her Xinjiang relatives.

The so-called three forces from Chinese perspective thus find ETIM, Yi-zha-bu-te, and Ms. Kadeer as the major anchors. These accusations begin to associate the current “three evil forces” to modern Xinjiang history, from the Yabub Khanate of the late 19th century to East Turkistan Republics (ETRs) in 1930s and 1940s. Thus, a coherent ideology and chronology of separatism, extremism, and terrorism is presented by Han scholars.

Likewise, the Uyghur have accused and condemned Chinese evil forces that are believed to contribute to the current situation of Xinjiang. These evil forces can be roughly summarized as:
Han immigration: Although the history of Han immigration to Xinjiang can be traced as early as the Han dynasty according to the Chinese side, the Uyghurs accusation of the Han immigration often concentrates on the modern period when the Communist regime has systematically changed Xinjiang population structure by implementing immigration policies and institutions such as the establishment of the Xinjiang Construction and Development Corps.

These newcomers have quickly occupied Xinjiang resources due to their various affiliations with the state apparatus and nepotism (as represented by Wang Lequan’s nepotism and his wife’s enterprise in Xinjiang). As complementary part of the Han immigration into Xinjiang, the Uyghurs have also been systematically emigrated from Xinjiang. This population change strategy finally causes the Shaoguan incident in 2009, which in turn ignites the 7/5 event at home of Urumuqi. All sectors of the Uyghur societies have consistently and repeatedly criticized this population change strategy (the best analogy to this population politics in Xinjiang is the Israeli settlement in occupied territories of Palestine), as seen in the latest Jihadist video

http://jihadology.net/2011/05/23/%E1%B9%A3awt-al-islam-presents-a-new-video-message-from-%E1%B8%A5izb-al-islami-al-turkistani-turkestan-islamic-party-message-to-the-chinese-people/

The second evil force from the Chinese side, as condemned by the Uyghurs and the international community, is the Chinese social and cultural assimilation of the Uyghurs. Again, this is two-folded policy: on the one hand, the Han culture and language education has been vigorously and forcefully implemented in various regions of Xinjiang. On the other hand, the Uyghur culture and tradition including Mashrap have been brutally suppressed in the name of maintaining security and stability in Xinjiang. This cultural assimilation attempt is most criticized by Uyghur intellectuals and Muslim groups.

The ultimate goal of these population, economic, cultural politics is to totally assimilate the Uyghurs into Han majoratian society. However, the Xinjiang issue involves more than Han and the Uyghurs. Many other peoples residing in and out Xinjiang have also been affected. Therefore, it is necessary to think about the Xinjiang issue from a third perspective, which should take consideration of several general factors that can be applied to all China’s citizens:

The first question is: is China a Han nation or multi-ethnic country? Although the Chinese states since the 1912 have rhetorically claimed that China is a country of 5 peoples and of 56 ethnicities, respectively in the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China, some Han ethnic centralism and chauvinism have been clear in major social, political, and ethnicity theories. As modern China’s sociologist and anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong, famously theorizes and equates China with Chinese/Han Nation (中华民族) and argues that other peoples (should) have affiliated (and assimilate) to the major body of the Han (汉族为主体的多元一体). This assimilationist theory of and approach to ethnic issues in contemporary China is to encourage the Han and Han culture as the state (such as the cult of Confucius and worship of ancestor of the Han such as 黄帝) while to marginalize and even illegalize minority cultural and historical practices such as Uyghur Mashrap as alien and even evil.

The cultural approach to China’s nation building neglects keys issues facing all minority populations in China: who are China’s citizen and who constitutes the Chinese state. It is widely known that ethnic minorities such as the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hui, and others have difficulty, if not access to, in applying for a passport at local region. Local public security office and religious and ethnic bureaus have relentlessly exploited the local minorities by receiving bribes and “deposits” when they apply for passport and other governmental documents. The existence of ultra militia in Xinjiang such as the Construction and Development Corps is regarded as normal and rewarded for their alleged contribution to local stability, without seeing the real nature of monopolizing local resources and justifying that monopoly in the name of maintaining security and stability. Even at the local level of law enforcement, the policemen openly favor and side with the Han to attack and arrest the Uyghurs after the July 5th event, as seen in the recent video.

http://news.backchina.com/viewnews-146929-gb2312.html

These issues, beyond ideological accusations, debates, and speculation, impose real challenges to the stability and harmony of Xinjiang. To achieve the prosperity and stability in Xinjiang, one has to start by asking: is China Han’s China? Are the Uyghur and other non-Han minority peoples second-class citizens of this country?

Wang Lequan: Dethroned but still an architect of CCP Xinjiang policy

Why is the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, instead of the National Development and Reform Commission, administering the economic development of Xinjiang? The following article is a response to the appointment of Wang Lequan as Deputy Chair of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee. The implications of this appointment on CCP policy toward Xinjiang are also addressed.

The appointment of Wang Lequan, Xinjiang Communist Party chief since December 1995, to the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee in Beijing has generated a good deal of discussion and debate among Xinjiang scholars and China watchers. Wang, originally from Shandong, has been succeeded by Zhang Chunxian, the former party secretary of his native Hunan Province (For an analysis of Han Chinese officials of Henan/Shandong origin in Xinjiang, see “Ningxia/Hui and Xinjiang/Uyghur: A Comparison” in http://www.xinjiangreview.com). Zhang is known for establishing a liberal economic policy in Hunan. He is also known for being a good communicator open to “creative” ideas, at least according to Vice President Xi Jinping. There is reason to hope that Zhang will lead the region in a new direction by implementing more liberal policies with a focus on tolerance and economic development.

To what extent will this changing of the guard result in policy reform in Xinjiang? The forthcoming policy changes are unknown to all but the secretive CCP politburo, but there is some evidence of a shift in the CCP’s Xinjiang strategy from political domination to economic development. Certain activities reinforce the belief that a policy shift is being effected, namely the formation of a Xinjiang work team and the initiation of a Xinjiang work conference. During this latter forum, many proposals and policies were discussed and publicized. Of potential vast importance, Kashgar has been anointed as a Special Economic Zone. This move has prompted some in the popular media to predict that Kashgar will emerge as a strategic center of commerce – the Shenzhen of Central Asia.

These official re-appointments, the Xinjiang work conference, along with a succession of CCP delegations from China proper to Xinjiang reinforce the impression that the CCP is advancing a strategic and serious change in its Xinjiang policy. These movements indicate that, as heralded by the Chinese media and officials, the “solution” to the Xinjiang “problem” is economic development. As a show of commitment to ameliorate the poor economy of the region, a significant aid package has been prepared. By undertaking these efforts, the Chinese government hopes to maintain the stability and unity of Xinjiang.

Despite these reappointments, proclamations and promises of economic assistance, there is reason to remain skeptical of these motions. The CCP is an authoritarian and paternalistic form of government and regional party secretaries are subordinate to Beijing. Therefore, a change in face should not be mistaken for a change in ideology. And although Wang Lequan was dethroned in Xinjiang, his reassignment as Deputy Chair of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee was not a demotion. This new role in a powerful CCP committee will allow him to form policies to be implemented in Xinjiang. Moreover, his new position will allow him to play a prominent role as architect of economic construction and reform in Xinjiang. This is unusual because CCP strategic economic plans are typically administered by the National Development and Reform Commission, not the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee. Even more ironic is that Wang Lequan is the acting team leader in the newly organized Xinjiang work team.

These circumstances raise serious questions on the future of Xinjiang: Why is the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee instead of the National Development and Reform Commission administering economic development in Xinjiang? Why is Wang Lequan leading the work team that is overseeing economic reform in Xinjiang? Has the CCP’s Xinjiang policy been reformulated, or have the rulers simply passed the mantle of repression? If change has been embraced, will the new policies reverse the intolerance and subsequent ethnic discord of the past? These questions demand complex answers as they necessitate a critical evaluation of past policy failures.

(For a Chinese-language covering of Wang Lequan’s dictatorship and corruption in Xinjiang, see http://www.aboluowang.com/news/data/2009/0710/article_80867.html)

Anti-terrorism: A New Rule for the Great Game in Central and South Asia

Since September 11, China has put the blame for a series of terrorist attacks in China, including ones in Beijing and Ürümqi, on the “three Uyghur forces” of extremism, separatism, and terrorism. The U.S. strike against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, China and the United States labeling the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization, and the subsequent capture of Uyghur “fighters” in Afghanistan, have allowed China to link the Uyghurs to Al-Qaeda.

Following several years of inhumane torture and illegal detention at Guantanamo Bay prison, those Uyghur fighters were found not to be enemy combatants. But while the U.S. is close to victory over Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan following the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, China seems to be stepping up its rhetoric and action in the so-called “war on terror” in China and beyond.

In July 2010, China and Pakistan held a joint counter-terrorist military exercise in Qingtong Xia (青铜峡 or Blue-bronze gorge) in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Chinese officials and experts attribute the choice of this region to its geographic and topographic proximity to the Sino-Pakistan border. But culturally, socially, and religiously Ningxia is another autonomous region like Xinjiang, dominated by a Muslim population. To locate such a joint military exercise in a Muslim area indicates an extension of China’s “war on terror” from Xinjiang Uyghus to Ningxia Hui.
(Another article on xinjiangreview.com analyzes proposals by China’s “anti-terror experts” or “project professors” for an “anti-three forces project” in Ningxia.)

In May 2011, China staged the second joint “Tianshan No. 2″ anti-terror military exercise together with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Chinese media and officials openly claim that East Turkestani terrorists cross the borders from Central Asia into China. Interestingly, only southwest Central Asian countries took part in this exercise. Kazakhstan and Russia, located in the region’s northwest, were notably absent.

This suggests that China’s prolonged “anti-terrorism” strategy may turn out to be one of the rules of a new great game in Central Asia between China, Russia, and India, and a number of outside influencers, including the United States. China is strengthening its ties with its southwestern SCO neighbors while Russia and Kazakhstan also seem to be forming a bloc within the SCO, for example by means of a customs union. Former Soviet Central Asia is likely to be dominated by China in the southwest and Russia in the northwest.

The assassination of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan did not win much applause in China. This isn’t because China stands by some moral principle that sanctions terrorism or assassinations, but because Obama’s announcement of the death of Osama greatly undermines Chinese claims of links between Uyghur terrorists, Al-Qaeda, and by extension the Taliban.
The same is also true for China’s support for Pakistan in it’s war on terror. Immediately after the assassination of Osama Bin Laden by the Obama administration, it was reported and now is confirmed that China will provide 50 JF-17 jets to the Pakistani air force within a few weeks. The next development, that China will take over operations at the Gwadar port at the request of the Pakistani government, followed on the heels of the announcement of intensified military cooperation. These developments reveal China’s strategic consideration of Pakistan’s role in “anti-terrorism” now and in the future.

It is clear that China is strengthening economic and military relationships with countries neighboring Kashgar, and reinforcing it’s relationship with Pakistan, in order to build a safe zone from Kashgar to Gwadar. The Kashgar-Gwadar corridor is important to China not only to gain access to energy from the gulf, but also to cut off Indian access to southern Central Asia. The “war on terror” is increasingly turning into a strategic ideology and a weapon for launching a new great game among former and rising powers in Central Asia.

Chinese State Shura? China’s Islamic Association and its Interpretation of Islamic Texts

Mr. Jia Qinglin, the third-ranking government official in China, recently had an audience with members of a special committee for the discussion, selection, and compilation of state-prescribed teachings of Islam. This Guiding Committee on Islamic Religious Affairs, which exists under the China Islamic Association and brings together influential Muslim Mullahs and Imams for the interpretation of scripture (Tafsir), celebrates its 10th anniversary in 2011. The teachings of this committee are spread among local Imams by means of recitation competitions, meetings, and other semi-official activities. In can be said that by means of this committee, China’s Islamic Association has been acting as a council guiding and governing Kutubs and Fatwas delivered by Imams in Mosques across China and especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

According to the working rules of the Guiding Committee on Islamic Religious Affairs, the mission of this committee is to promote accommodation of Islam to socialist society. These rules clearly stipulate that the objective of the committee is to fight extremism and maintain China’s sovereignty –– in other words to fight separatism. It also aims at standardizing interpretations of certain religious concepts, such as Jihad. The newly established scripture-interpretation committee of the China Islamic Association is fighting an ideological war against the so-called “three evil forces.”

中国伊斯兰教教务指导委员会工作规则
一、名称：中国伊斯兰教教务指导委员会
二、宗旨：本着维护人民利益，维护法律尊严，维护民族团结，维护祖国统一的原则，协助政府贯彻宗教信仰自由政策，在宪法、法律、法规和政策范围内，依据伊斯兰教经典及其内涵，结合我国实际情况，在穆斯林群众中宣传伊斯兰教正道，反对极端主义，维护伊斯兰教信仰的纯洁性，坚持团结办教，独立自主，自办教务，维护宗教和睦与社会和谐，促进我国伊斯兰教与社会主义社会相适应。
三、任务：指导国内伊斯兰教教务活动，包括组织、推动和指导《古兰经》诵读比赛、“卧尔兹”演讲比赛等活动；根据伊斯兰教经典及其内涵，在教义教规方面对当代中国穆斯林在宗教生活和社会生活中遇到的新情况和新问题做出解释，消除群众中在宗教问题上的误解与混乱，维护中国穆斯林内部的团结；研究和借鉴国际上“法特瓦”(教法案例)的成果；组织编写、出版讲经范本，并组织普及与推广活动，规范清真寺“卧尔兹”演讲内容；组织编写、翻译、审查伊斯兰教宣教书刊。
四、组织形式：中国伊斯兰教教务指导委员会为中国伊斯兰教协会内设的专门委员会，在中国伊斯兰教协会领导下开展工作，委员会由1 5―20位知名爱国伊斯兰教人士组成；成员经中国伊斯兰教协会与各地伊斯兰教协会协商，由地方提名，经中国伊斯兰教协会会长办公会议通过，颁发聘书，聘书有效期自颁发之日至新一届委员会产生止。委员会设主任1人，由中国伊斯兰教协会会长兼任；设副主任若干人，执行秘书1人，委员会下设秘书组，协助委员会开展日常工作。
五、本规则经中国伊斯兰教协会会长办公会议通过实施，由会长办公会议负责解释。
主任： 陈广元 副主任：阿荣汗阿吉 马云福
委员： 艾伯都拉大毛拉; 哈吉亚克巴尔•黄吾尔; 尤努斯 库尔班大毛拉; 尼亚孜卡日阿吉; 沙地克卡日阿吉; 马长庆; 马安泰; 马 贤; 谢生林; 马人斌; 敏生光; 马开贤; 吕金虎
执行秘书：马云福（兼）
中国伊斯兰教教务指导委员会秘书组成员名单：
组长： 马云福 （中国伊斯兰教协会副会长）
副组长： 阿地力 （中国伊斯兰教协会国际部副主任）
金汝彬 （中国伊斯兰教协会教务部负责人）
成员：马中平 （中国伊斯兰教协会研究部副主任）
马利强 （中国伊斯兰教协会编辑部副主任）
从恩霖 （中国伊斯兰教经学院教务处副主任）

A state council or committee to prescribe and disseminate orthodox teachings is nothing new to scholars of Islam. Iran and Saudi Arabia provide standard, state-defined Islamic teachings to their citizens under the supervision of Mullah or Shura councils.

But China in different in that the People’s Republic is an atheist county that claims to maintain a complete separation between the state and religious authorities. But under the leadership of the Association, some 15 to 20 Imams are put forward by regional religious bureaus to serve as committee members. Among the first committee members, five are from Xinjiang. Since the establishment of this committee in 2001, the China Islamic Association organizes annual Koran-recitation competitions and other activities. One of the much highlighted achievements of this committee is the compilation of collections of “Wo-er-zi,” or standard interpretations of Islamic texts such as the Koran. Interestingly these compilations and collections are called new interpretations (新编卧尔兹演讲集) and were “donated” to Xinjiang and the former Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with the Vice Chairman in attendance. As Mr. Jia Qinglin commented on April 25, in 10 years this scripture-interpretation has borne rich fruits in accommodating Islam to socialist China.

The establishment of government-approved religious committees reminds Muslims of policy ahongs, Imams that had been trained since the late 1950s in the hope of leading Muslims to socialism. Following China’s Open Door Policy, most of these Imams have been rejected by the local Muslim population. The new policy ahongs of today may one day share a familiar fate when China ends another ideological war against “-isms” such as separatism, extremism, and terrorism.

All the Way to Turkey: The Centrality of Turkey in China’s New Middle East policies

While the world focusses its attention on the Arab revolution and China detains dissident artists –– Ai Weiwei is only the most iconic case in point –– Turkey is quietly exerting its influence in different regions and on different nations.

Firstly, Turkey’s influence can be detected in the Arab revolution. Although Turkey carefully avoided direct involvement in the Jasmine revolution that swept the Arab world –– Turkey’s cautious and conservative attitude toward NATO airstrikes in Libya forms the exception –– the Turkish political model has become a hot topic of discussions among Arab Islamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. As Shadi Hamid made clear in a recent article published in Foreign Affairs, major Islamist organizations in the Middle East have expressed the desire for Islamist parties to seek positive participation in the secular and democratic countries that sprung up in the aftermath of the Jasmine revolution. It is ironic that in the religious heartland of Saudi Arabia, a royal dictatorship backed by the West, a secular Turkey is providing political inspiration to religious Muslims. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire in making a return, albeit in a different way and in a different context.

Secondly, also in the Middle East, Turkey exerts an influence on Iran. As Western countries arrogantly practice double standards and hypocrisy regarding the development of nuclear technology –– think Israel’s nuclear arsenal –– Iran has found in Turkey a quite reliable and trustworthy partner, even if it’s applying for EU membership. Despite the Western rejection of Turkey’s proposal for Iranian uranium enrichment, Turkey and Iran seem to have reached agreements on many issues.

Thirdly, Turkish influence in the NATO, and by extension on the West, is evident. Libya provides only the most recent case in point. Turkey opposed unilateral military action by the French and insisted on joint operations under the leadership of the NATO. The West and Israel regard American and Israeli relations with Turkey as exemplary relationships between a Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Americans, Arabs, Jews, and Persians find in Turkey a model country –– a religiously, politically, and ethnically diverse island in a disorderly Middle East.

But the Turkish influence spreads far beyond the Middle East. The Uyghurs of China, ethnic and religious brethren of the Turks, have long regarded Turkey as the remote motherland. Many Uyghur nationalist movements operate out of Turkey. The Uyghurs residing in China, especially the middle class, imitate a real or imagined Turkish lifestyle in silent protest against Chinese suppression. To enjoy traditional Uyghur foods in an Eden (“Yidian”) restaurant represents the modernity the Uyghurs wish for and practice in China.

It’s amazing that China has sought to improve its relationship with Turkey in recent years. It may come as a surprise that China received the Turkish Foreign Minister for a visit to Uyghur communities shortly after Prime Minister Erdogan voiced harsh criticism of China’s handling of the ethnic violence that struck Ürümqi in 2009. More recently, on a visit of a Muslim delegation of the China Islamic Association to Turkey, the two countries signed an agreement on the training of Chinese Imams, which will take place in Turkey in the future.

China and Turkey are negotiating more and more agreements on education, trade and transportation, the military, and so on. The purpose of China’s approach to Turkey is not completely clear. If China needs help from Turkey to deal with the Uyghur issue, then China’s comprehensive engagement with Turkey may indicate the start of a strategic Middle Eastern diplomacy centered on Turkey –– not unlike the Islamist, the Christian, and the Zionist strategy. Saudi Arabia and Iran form another two pivots in this strategy.

Turkey benefits enormously from its geographic and ideological context. A new and modern Turkey is being reborn as a mini Ottoman Empire at the heart of the Eurasian continent, thanks in part to support from China.

Cyber Activism without Reaching out: Uyghur Websites and Chinese Audiences

The role of communication technology in social movements (esp in ethnic nationalism) has been highlighted in social sciences in recent decades. The traditional cases of activism such as Burma and Tibet in which the cyber world has played important role are well documented. In the recent Uyghur case, scholars have also introduced the concept of “cyber” in analyzing the resistance of Uyghur Diasporas against the Chinese colonial rule of Xinjiang and maltreatment of the Uyghurs.

According to some scholars on Uyghur cyber activism, the role of the Uyghur cyber world in publicizing the Uyghur issue and communicating with governments and organizations is enormous. It is indeed that there are plenty Uyghur websites that have begun to grow in many languages, predominately English and Uyghur. The role of the internet communication in internationalizing the Uyghur issue is evidenced not only by the number of these websites but also by the recent Chinese persecution of the webmasters of the Uyghurbiz or Uyghur online in China. It simply testifies the power of the cyber world and its effect on the Chinese government.

However, among many Uyghur websites, to my knowledge, there is no oversea Uyghur website in Chinese language. It seemingly indicates that the Uyghur exiles forget that the largest audience of the Uyghur/Xinjiang issue is the Chinese world. This makes the Uyghurs in exile face a serious challenge that few Chinese audience listens to the Uyghur voice. Unlike the Tibetan issue and the Dalai Lama, there are not too many Chinese people ( in China or/and abroad) who are well aware of the Uyghur and Xinjiang.

Tactically, it is hard to publicize the Uyghur issue among the Chinese, not to mention telling them the truth about the Uyghur misery and gaining their sympathy. The Sept 11th event and China’s “anti-terrorism” already have deteriorated the Chinese image or imagination of Muslims in China, especially the Uyghurs. The lack of Chinese webs and the silence about Chinese accusation of the Uyghurs to some extent make the just Uyghur cause more vulnerable and illegitimate among the ordinary Chinese for the long run.

The popularity of the Dalai Lama among many Chinese (esp intellectuals) is not only because of his personal charisma but also because of the Tibetan cyber world that includes Chinese –language websites, which make Tibetan/Dalai Lama’s voice to be heard among the Chinese. In light of the coming Uyghur conference in Washington, this issue should be raised if Uyghur diaphoretic leadership hopes to inform the Chinese about the nature of the Uyghur/Xinijang issue.

An Internal Reflection on the corruption of the Bingtuan in Xinjiang: 看看兵团的腐败

This is an internal reflection on the corruption of the bingtuan in Xinjiang

http://hexun.com/jiujiuzhongguo/messageboard.html By Zhongqiuyue or Mid-Autumn Moon

看看兵团的腐败

我在新疆兵团工作过十几年。见到这些情况太多了。不要说是个团长，就是个连长，每年贪污受贿也不少。我们先讲讲建设。我是在兵团最富裕的师农八师石河子市工作。那里的市政府大楼比上海市政府（人民广场）那个还有宏伟高大。你不要忘了。我们石河子的产值就是夸大捏造也不到10亿3.而上海可是1万亿。可是你到号称兵团最富裕的145团的基础连队的家里去看看。我是不敢进门。因为我发现民房已经快40－50年。到处是裂缝。快塌了。我只有把人叫道院子里说话。这就印证了一句名言城市建设的像欧洲。农村建设像非洲。

兵团腐败2

兵团的腐败还有以下特征。我在兵团·生活了30多年。你们知道就是全国实现计划生育也是人口正增长。可是兵团人口确实保持不变或负增长。你知道是为什么。难道是死亡率高或出生率低。都不是。况且边境团场你生第二胎还给奖励（十年前就是几千元）。原因就是兵团体制不对。官员太腐败。现在许多团场已经很少有职工种地。有本事的人全跑了。常常是内地的农民来包地种，你说说为什么那么优越的地理条件为什么不种地。就是层层扒皮。在春季保地每个农工要给连长送钱。才能保到好地。夏季秋季在送钱你才能浇上水，收割机才不至于你家的粮食倒伏了才去收割。而连长对受贿的钱也不能全捞。要拿出相当一部分給团长。团长才是兵团的土皇帝。手里有人事权和财政权。那个叫说一不二。

兵团的腐败3

兵团·是层层腐败。你一个团长夫人就这么牛逼。你这是在甘肃就这么厉害。你要他回到属地。那叫天高皇帝远。什么坏事都能干。一个团他年初和团里职工订立的承办合同。到了秋收他觉得受贿少了。马上撕毁合同。压级压价收购。还指定不允许卖到地方（沙湾县、玛纳斯县）。你要偷运到外县。他就武装设卡。打你没商量，棉花没收还有罚款。你要是不交，想藏在家里等风声小了再卖。那也不行。团里连里的的武装工作队就开始抄家。你反抗就打。棉花没收还有罚款。你想向人民法院起诉。不受理。兵团法院向最高法院讲兵团的事由兵团法院内部处理。好了新疆地方的其他法院不能受理兵团·人提交的诉讼。而兵团分院有规定各个师法院不得受理职工告团场的案件。兵团的职工是很苦。所以大家就跑了。人口自然就下降了。

兵团的腐败4

而那些团长或更高的师长一级的。就玩别的招数。他们不跑。跑了一年至少少收入10万。他们曲线救国。他们用手里的权或钱把子女送到内地大城市工作。在内地大城市买房。这样他们的腐败在当地就不太显眼。你讲讲买一套100多万的房子等在兵团退休后住。是不是有腐败问题。而对与一个团场连路灯都没有几个。却在城市里学什么大连珠海。大会上讲搞亮化工程。然后就是全部亮化工程包给自己的亲戚。捞的可是不少。改春播了。师里领导的亲戚就去团里推销低级高级的化肥。到了秋季又拿着师领导的条子去低级收购高级别的农产品。团长你要是不给面子明年的春节就是你的忌日（每年春节一过就是安排人事任命时间).还有那个春节你看看银行的钱就该大进大出了。最近我才知道原来团长们不是拿自己家的钱給师领导送。而是各个团的经费。厉害呀。连买官也可以公费报销了。

兵团的腐败5

兵团农民苦。还有层层大山的压迫。在兵团的干部比新疆多。小小十来万人（职工加家属）也是一个师。就是个地级（专员）配置。一个师下面几十个处或局。还有十几个团。团里下面又有十几个连和十几个科室。这些编制全是兵团农工养。兵团内部有公检法。军事部门。银行。听说以后还会有工商和税务部门。到处是官老爷。到处是吸血鬼。新疆一把手王乐泉做别的事我不知道。但是我知道他最烦兵团。因为这是个无法无天的独立王国。兵团的领导就会到北京去反映我们兵团多苦多危险。然后骗钱。就是这些专项经费也被层层剥皮了。没有几个可以到职工手中。其实兵团全是汉人居住区。就没有任何民族分裂的危险。。我看如果兵团的体制问题不解决好。倒是对新疆的前途是个很大的危险。

新疆建设兵团共辖十四个师，分辖农牧团场：

　　农业建设一师：驻阿克苏，辖1-16团场，分布于阿克苏地区，人口25.24万；

　　农二师：驻库尔勒，辖21-36团场，分布于巴音郭楞州，人口20万；

　　农三师：师部未详，辖41-49、51-54团场、2个水库、1个农场、1个总场，分布于塔克拉玛干沙漠边缘和叶尔羌河和喀什噶尔河流域，人口16.9万；

　　农四师：驻伊宁，辖61-79团场，分布于伊犁州直辖区西部，人口22万，又名新疆伊犁农垦农工商联合总公司；

　　农五师：驻博乐，辖81-91团场，分布于博尔塔拉州，人口9.97万；

　　农六师：驻五家渠，辖101-111团场，8个农场，分布于北塔山、玛纳斯河、天山、古尔班通古特沙漠之间，人口26.9万；

　　农七师：驻奎屯，辖123-131、137团场，分布于伊犁州直辖区东部，人口20.6万；

　　农八师：驻石河子，辖121-122、132-136、141-144、147-150、152团场，1个总场、1个种羊场，分布于天山北麓中段，准噶尔盆地南缘，人口58.19万；

　　农九师：驻额敏县，辖161-170团场，1个农场，分布于中哈边境线上，人口7.1万； 农十师：驻北屯，辖181-190团场，1个独立营场，分布于阿勒泰和塔城地区，人口7.1万；

　　工业建设师：驻乌市，以建筑业为主；

　　农十二师：驻乌鲁木齐市北京北路，是乌鲁木齐市重要的瓜果蔬菜、牛奶蛋禽、肉食水产三大副食品生产基地和粮油生产、种子、啤酒花生产以及工业品生产基地，辖104团，4个农场，1个养禽场，分布在乌市西郊和南郊，环绕乌市，人口5.46万，即乌鲁木齐农场管理局；

　　农十三师：驻哈密，辖9个农场，2个牧场，分布于新疆东部哈密地区一市两县内，东倚甘肃酒泉地区，西邻吐鲁番地区和昌吉回族自治州，南接巴音郭楞蒙古自治州，北与蒙古国接壤，人口数不详，即旧兵团农场管理局；

　　农十四师：驻和田，辖47团场，1个农场、1个牧场，分布于和田，人口数不详，即旧和田农场管理局；

　　直属团场：221-223团场。

The Future of the Uyghurs: An International Conference

The Future of the Uyghurs

East Turkestan: US to Host Major Conference on the Future for Uyghurs

An international conference in the Capitol Building will gather Congressmen and leading experts to discuss the future of the Uyghur people, this opening ceremony will later be followed by internal discussions for the Uyghur diaspora community.
Below is a press release published by the
World Uyghur Congress:

WUC Announcement: International Conference “The Future of Uyghur People in East Turkestan” – UPDATE
Press Release – For immediate release
15 April 2011
Contact: World Uyghur Congress www.uyghurcongress.org
0049 (0) 89 5432 1999 0049 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              0049 (0) 89 5432 1999 0049      end_of_the_skype_highlighting (0) 89 5432 1999 or contact@uyghurcongress.org
From May 2-8, 2011 the international conference The Future of Uyghur People in East Turkestan co-sponsored by Freedom House, World Uyghur Congress (WUC), Uyghur American Association (UAA) and the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF), will take place in Washington, D.C.
The World Uyghur Congress is pleased to announce that the opening ceremony of the conference will be held at:
U.S. Capitol Building (room location to be announced)
The opening ceremony will commence on May 2, 2011 at 10.00h with a speech by WUC President and longstanding Uyghur human rights activist Rebiya Kadeer, and will include a number of distinguished speakers.
Scheduled guest speakers are:
Hon. Frank R. Wolf (U.S. Congressman)
Hon. Jim McGovern (U.S. Congressman)
Carl Gershman (President, National Endowment for Democracy),
Louisa Coan Greve (Vice President, National Endowment for Democracy),
Randall Shriver (Former Assistant Secretary of State)
T. Kumar (Advocacy Director for Asia and the Pacific, Amnesty International USA)
Dr. Gunawardena-Vaughn (Director of the International Religious Freedom Consortium and the Southeast Asia Program, Freedom House)
Dr. Sophie Richardson (Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, Asia Division, tbc)
After the Opening Ceremony, the Uyghur community will stage a demonstration in front of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, DC.
From May 3 – 8, 2011 the conference The Future of Uyghur People in East Turkestan will be held at:
Holiday Inn
Carradoc Hall
1500 East Market Street
Leesburg, VA 20176
This conference is an internal conference for the Uyghur Diaspora community and its main goal is to provide a constructive forum for Uyghur leaders from around the world to discuss the ongoing violations of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights suffered by the Uyghur people in East Turkestan. The delegates will also discuss the situation of Uyghur refugees around the world in order to find effective solutions to provide legal and moral assistance and support.
Delegates from all over the world will explore common strategies, effective political platforms, and future steps. Delegates will include members of the WUC and non-WUC affiliated Uyghur community leaders and intellectuals. Around 200 Uyghur delegates from more than 20 countries from around the world are expected to participate in the conference.
For questions, please contact:
US:
Omer Kanat okanat@iuhrdf.org
Alim Seytoff aseytoff@uyghuramerican.org
Phone: +1 202 4781920 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              +1 202 4781920      end_of_the_skype_highlighting +1 202 4781920 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              +1 202 4781920      end_of_the_skype_highlighting ext. 106
Fax: +1 202 4781910

Germany:
Dolkun Isa
dolkun@gmail.com Phone: +49 89 54321999 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              +49 89 54321999      end_of_the_skype_highlighting +49 89 54321999 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              +49 89 54321999      end_of_the_skype_highlighting
Fax: +49 89 54349789

The International Conference on the Future of the Uyghurs, recently announced by the World Uyghur Congress and the Uyghur Association of America, poses big questions about the future of the Uyghurs and will guide the discussion for some time to come. Such questions have been debated, opinions have been circulated, and answers have been promoted at length among the people in exile, who suffer enormously at the hands of governments with different ideologies.

History holds two precedents that may guide the discussion. One is the Jewish question in the 20th century and the other is the Tibetan cause today.

Israel provides an example of the establishment of an independent state and provides a solution for the future of the Jews at the expense of the Palestinians. The Tibetans have achieved nothing but the recognition of the personal charisma of the Dalai Lama and the internationalization of the Tibetan issue.

One can quickly draw the conclusion that a realistic future for the Uyghurs cannot be modeled on the Jewish case. Realpolitik, the growth of China’s economic, military, and political clout, and China’s efforts at cultural diplomacy prohibit such a solution.
So what might the future of Xinjiang look like if we model it on the Tibetan case? From the outset, internationalizing the Uyghur issue and winning sympathy around the world throws up several obstacles.

1. After September 11, and under the guise of a war on Muslim states (Iraq, Afghanistan, recently Libya, possibly Iran), the moral and material support of a world dominated by the Christian West is questionable. The US and China jointly labeled the so-called East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization. Given such a relationship between Christian hegemons and Muslim victims, can the Christian West truly support the establishment of a Muslim Uyghur state in Central Asia?

2. Unlike the Tibetans, who share a common religion in Tibetan Buddhism or Lamaism, and have a central leadership under the Dalai Lama, the Uyghurs aren’t nearly so united. While Uyghurs are predominately Muslim, increasing numbers are converting to Christianity. This is true even among the Uyghur leadership. And while Uyghurs have begun to submit to Ms. Kadeer as their unifying leader, her leadership and her succession lack religious justification and institutional legitimacy. Several critical questions have been asked. Firstly, can a woman lead the struggle of the Muslim Uyghurs? Secondly, can a secular leader –– be that Ms. Kadeer or somebody else –– lead the Muslim Uyghurs?

3. Unlike the Tibetan movement, which calls for greater autonomy, the Uyghur leadership in exile seems to lack a pragmatic and coherent agenda. Democracy and freedom are good aspirations when one aims to raise funds, but such causes are most unrealistic given that China is not a democracy. The question in the face of a communist or nationalist China should be: what aims do the Uyghur leadership and the overseas Uyghurs attempt to realize?

These questions and issues are critical and challenging. At the same time we see a positive development. Another conference in Brussels earlier this year raised awareness about the situation of the Uyghurs among congressmen in the United States. Publicizing the Uyghur issue and gaining support and sympathy are positive outcomes of such conferences. What is more, an internal discussion could bring overseas Uyghurs together and allow them to reach a consensus on key issues such as leadership, fundraising, propaganda, presenting a united front, and so on.

This conference is imperative for the discussion –– if not the decision –– on the future of the Uyghurs in the new world context.

Human Rights issue and the Uyghurs in EU: Conference and Resolution

Just as Germany is more and more familiar with its Turkish citizens, and is deeply involved in Turkish affairs, so the European Union is raising concerns about the Turkic Uyghur population in Xinjiang, China. The European concern for the Uyghurs highlights two aspects. On the one hand we have the European tradition in human rights advocacy and diplomacy, while on the other hand we see concerns about China’s human rights record in China proper widen in scope to the country’s engagement in Central Asia.

EU concern about the Uyghurs and Xinjiang stands in sharp contrast to the cooperation of the United States with the Chinese government in the war against so-called Uyghur terrorists groups such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Europe’s large Turkic population and the different approaches to China’s Uyghurs –– one humanist, the other pragmatist –– may be indicative of the future of the Xinjiang issue in EU and U.S. policy on China.

Recent EU concerns about the Uyghurs were triggered by the “Dangerous House Reform” project (危房改造) implemented by the Chinese government in Kashgar in 2009. This project cost at least $500 million. The alleged purpose of the project is to modernize the traditional Uyghur community and neighborhood in order to improve sanitation and protection from natural disasters. In the eyes of Uyghur residents, human rights watchers, cultural experts, religious groups, policy makers, and others, this official explanation does not justify the wanton destruction of houses, madrases, tombs, and other sites of historic, cultural, ethnic, and religious value. The local Uyghur and other non-Han populations share a deep attachment to these sites, which are representative of the area’s Uyghur, Turkic, Islamic, and Central Asian heritage.

The Dangerous House Reform project prompted Frieda Brepoels, EU parliamentarian and member of the committee on EU foreign affairs, and colleagues to raise “the Kashgar issue.” On Feb. 27, 2011, an international conference on the city of Kashgar was held in Brussels with representatives of the Uyghurs and experts of Xinjiang in attendance. These provided different perspectives on the significance of Kashgar to the Turkic populations of Central Asia, to Silk Road history, and to humanity. Participants included the World Uyghur Congress, the Uyghur American Association, the UNESCO, the Laogai Research Foundation, Xinjiang Review, the International Campaign for Tibet, and other organizations and groups. Conference participants reached a consensus on the preservation and protection of the Kashgar Uyghur community for its significance to humanity in such fields as architecture and design.

The conference resulted in the European Parliament passing resolution 122 on the situation and cultural heritage in Kashgar.
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110310IPR15261/html/Human-rights-Pakistan-Belarus-and-China)
This resolution makes reference to international agreements on human rights, protection of cultural heritage and religious freedom, the Chinese constitution and other Chinese laws, and EU-China bilateral agreements. It points out that Kashgar retains highly symbolic value for the cultural and religious identity of the Uyghurs and that the justification of the Chinese government does not necessitate the complete demolition of traditional buildings.

The resolution calls on the Chinese government to do the following:
1. to stop the destruction of cultural heritage in the ancient city of Kashgar and to protect the cultural identity of the Uyghurs;
2. to end all forced resettlements and the social marginalization of the Uyghur population in their hometown;
3. to implement the Chinese constitution by preserving Uyghur cultural heritage;
4. to assess the possibility of including Kashgar in an application for UNESCO world heritage designation of the Silk Road; and
5. to stop all discriminating and repressive policies towards Muslims in Xinjiang.
The resolution also calls for EU representatives and for the EU Commission for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to discuss these issues with the Chinese government.

While the impact of this resolution on the Chinese government and its decision makers is hard to measure, it is clear that the EU prioritizes the Uyghurs and Xinjiang on its list of human rights concerns in China. While the US is consolidating its relationships with Japan and South Korea on China’s eastern seaboard, the EU has stepped up its efforts on Xinjiang and China’s northwest instead.