In Xinjiang, however, under the current continuous context of anti (so-called) three forces, especially the so-called religious extremism, the definition of Qingzhen in Xinjiang may gradually falls into the category of fake Halal: as long as only lamb and beef are served in a restaurant, then it is considered as Qingzhen, which in turn is seen as Halal. There is a strong likelihood of this tendency that one day, just like wearing beard and niqabs have been directed to government assigned “civilized” and “modern” “beard-less” face and bikini-style clothes in Uyghur populated areas (especially in Khotan and Kashgar), eating Halal seems to have been replaced by consuming fake Halal, or the government defined and certified “Qingzhen.” If Xinjiang is to develop Qingzhen food industry and export to Islamic countries, then Xinjiang should introduce international Halal certification and abandon its official definition of Islamic food and other religious aspects.

The first decade of the 21st century witnesses changes Xinjiang in terms of China’s ruling strategy and development policy: the replacement of decade-long, hardline party-secretary (or King of Xinjiang called by local Uyghurs) by relatively open-minded Zhang Chunxian and the following development of Kashgar 2011 are the reflection of and modification in China’s conservative and harsh policy towards this restive region.

Regarding to the role of Kashgar, it seems there is confusion in China’s positioning of Kashgar that it is sometimes defined as economic center of “Central Asia” and sometimes as that of “mid-South Asia.” If the former is the case, then what’s relationship between Kashgar special economic zone and Horgos special economic zone and between Kashgar and Urumuqi? If the latter is the case, then, the question becomes much more complicated: what role will Kashgar special economic zone play in mid- South Asian economy (from Afghanistan to northern Pakistan and northern India) given the complicated relations among China, India, and Pakistan? Even if the Chinese development strategy in Kashgar complements regional Central Asian or South Asian economic networks or projects such as Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation or CAREC in which China is a member, how could Kashgar position itself in the US-led new Silk Road strategy which obviously attempts to avoid old commercial and cultural centers under Chinese sovereignty such as Kashgar? If these questions cannot be properly answered, then the so-called Kashgar special economic zone may not help China to break it Malacca yoke, as many strategists have argued, it may cause new tension with other competing powers such as India and the U.S. in China’s western borderland.

A recent article (or more precisely a dialogue) by Ma Rong马戎, a graduate from Brown University and a retired professor of sociology of Peking University published on China’s Ethnic Studies (《中国民族》2011年09期，第4-12页) has caused a hot debate and dispute among China’s academics, policy-makers, and oversea ethnic dissidents. The central point expressed in this and other articles by Ma Rong is that de-politicization and enculturalization of ethnicity in China will grant more complete citizenship to China’s minority peoples (“‘去政治化’和‘文化化’的意思，就是要给少数民族更大的活动空间和更完整的公民权利！).

It is interesting to note that Ma Rong first expressed his new thought on current China’s ethnic policy in an article entitled “A New Thought on Ethnic Relations: De-politicization of Minority Ethnic Issues” in 2004 when he was going to retire. The timing of his publication of this artilce may indicate the sensitivity of ethnic issues in China that he had to discuss the issue at the time of retirement. During his recent dialogue with interviewers, Ma elaborates his thought by arguing that in the new international context (probably after the collapse of the Soviet and Yugoslavia and the formation of Central Asian Republics and Balkan states), Han, Manchu, Hui, Mongols, Tibetans, Uyghurs and other ethnicities have formed an interest unity (利益共同体) and scholars have to think about the domestic unity of Zhonghua Minzu (中华民族内部的团结) and the serious external challenges from the perspective of 1.3 Billion Chinese population(外部国际社会的严峻挑战). In other words, Ma Rong’s new thought on ethnic relations is aimed at searching for a new way to deal with external challenges by building up domestic consensus and unity through de-politicization of ethnicity. These external challenges come from western countries, according to Ma Rong. Had national unity not been build up and had ethnic intellectuals not been unified, he insists, China would not have been able to be made as a real nation-state (民族国家) and would not have been able to respond to western powers that have targeted China as “potential enemy” (潜在敌人”) and have adopted double standards (采用双重标准的西方国家).

The historical and cultural foundation for building a large national identity, as Ma Rong argues for, is the fact that all ethnic groups of China have identified with a Pan-Zhonghua 泛中华, or as expressed in terms such as Zhonghua(中华), Zhongguo （中国）, Zhongguoren （中国人）and other historical and cultural concepts since the Han dynasty, which forms the cultural and political foundation of diversified yet unified Zhonghuaminzu (中华民族“多元一体”格局). Ma Rong here seems to follow his predecessor, Fei Xiaotong’s notions and hypothesis on the relationship between the Han and non-Han peoples. Ma selects several entirely Han-centric terminologies and unilaterally attempts to extend them to non-Han peoples. He goes so far as to argue that the so-called Zhonghuaminzu should be unified as a national group or nationality (国族) of China, a term used 1 century ago by Chinese nationalists such as Sun Yat-sun to conduct indepdent movments.

Probably for preventing possible non-Han ethnic nationalism and for better converting non-Han ethnic diversity into Han unity, Ma Rong proposed as early as in 2001 to replace China’s nationality with ethnicity (or ethnic groups). Following this early thinking, Ma Rong suggests that non-Han cadres and intellectuals should expand their horizon from ethnic autonomy to national stage. Ma Rong even confidentially predicts that his proposal would be welcomed especially by cadres who have long worked in ethnic regions (长期在民族地区工作的干部, Han cadres or ethnic cadres??) and have been troubled by various daily ethnic issues.

Meanwhile, Ma Rong also expresses his concern that ethnic intellectuals and cadres may oppose his ideas because this change in ethnic politics may weaken favorite policies towards ethnic minorities. Ma Rong cites American blacks (美国黑人) as an example to prove the success of the lack of ethnic policies in the U.S. He points out that American blacks have not been assigned to their own ethnic schools as China’s ethnic minorities have been. Many American blacks have thus studied in top universities and have access to national leadership positions.

Ma Rong’s de-politicization of ethnic relations to some extent acknowledges the fact that China’s ethnicities have long been politicized and China’s non-Han peoples have long been discriminated in the past decades when ethnic theory and practice have been adopted by the new regime. His new thought also indirectly indicates the tragedy that China’s ethnic policy has not granted non-Han peoples equal citizenship in academic, social, cultural, and political arenas of contemporary China.

In his eyes, to eliminate the ethnic markers and barriers including ethnic autonomy may promise a better and larger social, economic, and political future for non-Han minorities, as African Americans have achieved. However, this America-trained student of sociology has not learned that the success of African Americans has not resulted from the lack of ethnic policies or of ethnic differences in the U.S., it is the U.S constitution and other laws that guarantee African Americans as well as other non-Caucasian American citizens to have equal access to jobs, school, position, and etc. This can be best seen in employment in the US that American laws prohibits the discrimination on the basis of age, race, creed, color, religion, marital status, gender, sexual oriental, veteran status, national origin, or disability status. This equal right has been achieved through African American’s civil rights (not ethnic movements!!) in 60s.

In China, however, all non-Han peoples are encouraged or forced in one way or another to weaken or abandon their cultural traits such as religion in all public spaces and no law guarantees the equal right of non-Han peoples’s citizneship (for example, passport application is one of the basic rights for all citizen in any modern nation state. But in China, an ordinary Tibetan or Muslim has been actually denied access to passport!). To Mr. Ma Rong, a simple question should be asked: America’s White House can hire a Muslim lady wearing typical Muslim dress and working for the American government, is such practice possible or even thinkable in Han-ruled China? Why non-Han people’s ethnic markers (such as history, culture, and religion), instead of China’s politics and policies, have been singled out by these scholars for discussion and solution?

To blame and target non-Han cultures, histories, and religions as barrier for China’s national unity always indicates a Han cultural chauvinism. From Fei Xiaotong’s diversity in unity of Zhonghuaminzu to Ma Rong’s national group 国族 (a narrow-minded daydream against the trend of globalization), it clearly shows the logic of the thinking of non-Han peoples by Han, near-Han, or Hanified scholars that China’s ethnic harmony can only be realized through assimilation.

If China is truly hoping to achieve national unity and solidary, it should reflect on its politics and policies that have discriminated non-Han populations, not criticizing non-Han ethnic markers. If China really hopes to improve its ethnic relations, then it should hire more legalists and attorneys, not anthropologists or ethnologists, as advisors for their policy formulation.

It is not surprising that some reports even attribute the recent violence in Xinjiang to the state prohibition of wearing headscarves (http://topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/Ban-on-Islamic-dress-sparked-Uygur-attack). In addition to ethnic cultural centralism of immigrant Han to Xinjiang, it should be kept in mind that contemporary Xinjiang policy towards Uyghur dressing indicates the short period of Han interaction with the Uyghur population and shallow Han perception of rich Uyghur cultures. Given the fact that the Han migrating to Xinjiang are state-sponsored and therefore are much powerful and wealthier, taking off Uyghur women’s headscarf represents Han bourgeois attitudes towards Uyghur women’s dressing. Just like the European bourgeois attempt to “liberate” women from the medieval ages by prescribing certain styles, newly rising Han bourgeois are defining “progress” and “enlightenment” in Xinjiang in the name of security and sovereignty. This political and cultural effort to undress Uyghur women actually fits Samuel Huntington’s hypothesis of the clash of civilization that Han officials and intellectuals are tarkgeting Uyghur Muslims as enemy.

However, this is only one side of Chinese policy and approach to Muslim headscarf. In the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia, Muslim dressing has not been targeted, at least not publicly, as the symbol of backwardness, conservativeness, and even fundamentalism. Rather, contrary to Xinjiang’s isolation of Uyghurs from the Islamic culture and the Islamic world, Ningxia has recently reached out to Arab countries by using the advantage of Muslim cultural and religious connection with the Islamic world. Together with building world Islamic Village (see another article on Xinjiangreview.com and xinjiangreview.wordpress.com), holding Sino-Arab Economic Forum, certifying Halal food and exporting Halal products to the Muslim world, Ningxia government’s patronage of Muslim women’s dress as fashion indicates that Muslim dressing can be an opportunity for business and friendship. After a thousand of years of advent of Islam into China, Han perception and patronage of Muslim dress (e.g. Hijab) in Ningxia and other interior regions as fashion promises China’s tolerance towards Muslims, multi-culturalism, and cosmopolitanism in future.

When China is actively reaching out to the world by engaging in civilizational dialogue, its approach to Uyghur dressing, especially headdress, is adversely pushing China back to a Han Chauvinist country, without respecting basic Chinese reality and constitution that China is constituted by 56 ethnic groups with their distinct cultures. While Ningxia’s approach to Muslim dress, on the other hand, nicely bridges Muslim tradition and modernity, economy and culture, China and the Islamic World, promising a peace and prosperity between Muslims and Han.

http://www.newcenturynews.com/Article/shiye/201108/20110806234339.html).

For non-Chinese media, the killing of the attack suspects is simply translated as “shot dead,” as if the suspects were killed during fire exchange or due to resistance to arrest (e.g., http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-01/chinese-police-shoot-dead-xinjiang-attack-suspects-xinhua-says.html). Actually the Chinese term就地正法 means much more than just “shot dead.” It literally means justifiable execution on the spot or justifiable instant execution, as indicated by “正”, and this trial-omitting practice had been popular in China’s dynasties. Some Chinese observers see the re-introduction of term and practice in Xinjiang as an indication in the change of China’s anti-terror strategy (e.g., http://www.jqgc.com/gjjq/12726.shtml). Many others, especially legal experts, have expressed the concern over the use/abuse of the term even when fighting and arresting the attack suspects in Kashi. As Li Xuxi of Ziguan Law Firm in Beijing states, instant execution violates Chinese laws and the Xinjiang authorities should not use the term. Another attorney, Pu Zhiqiang points out that such execution of the suspects by the Xinjiang authority is scaring and he urges the Chinese authority to re-consider the excessive use of forces in Xinjiang.

http://www.voanews.com/chinese/news/20110805-Xinjiang-police-action-126825608.html

To carry out the execution on ideological ground (e.g., three forces) without investigating the cause of the violence and the background of the case simply constitutes a political campaign. The Chinese people had suffered bitterly from various political campaigns from 1950s to 1970s, as millions of people were executed without legal trail. In Xinjiang today, numerous “internal regulations” and the use/abuse of instant execution is making a systematic campaign against the Uyghurs as a whole. It seems to indicate that Xinjiang is now experiencing what China proper had experienced before 1978.

What U.S. drone attack in AFPAK regions and Chinese instant execution in Xinjiang share is the lack of transparency and legal justification. Drone attack and instant execution makes the American and Chinese behavior more like assassination, especially when this act is carried out by intelligence unit or special force. In other words, killing without legal procedure blurs the difference between terrorists and anti-terrorists. The lasting violence in AFPAK regions and the causalities of both Americans and local population have forced American scholars to reflect on war ethnics of drone attacks. Similarly, the deteriorating situation in Xinjiang should alert the Chinese authorities, local or central, to re-think about the law-violating practices such as 就地正法 when dealing with the so-called evil forces.

Of course, China’s domestic investments and investors in Kashar primarily come from rich East China by region or from the wealthier Han by ethnicity. During a recent trip to various cities and counties in southern Xinjiang, I heard many Han businessmen had repeatedly stated that Kasha, as a special economic zone, is the last to get rich. It is said that within two years, the housing price is doubled in good locations in Kashi. This may explain why, in addition to political reasons, local officials and businessmen are eager to torn down old Uyghur communities and build skyscrapers in the name of economic development and ethnic harmony, a fortune-seeking pattern popular seen in many interior cities.

Since most Uyghurs are unable to “upgrade” to new apartments or to “re-model” their old houses, they have increasingly become marginalized even in their “town:” not only the destruction of their tradition houses and business worsens their current economy, but also the coming of large number of Han officials, volunteers, merchants, police, workers, and others who benefit from the development contribute to rising price from housing to food.
Several Chinese scholars in Beijing have actually noticed the dilemma in the state-sponsored development that on the one hand, economic development is expected to reduce ethnic tension between the Han and Uyghurs, while on the other hand, the beneficiary are mostly Han, which actually increases economic gap between the two groups and generates more ethnic problems.

In other words, violence in Xinjiang cannot be interpreted only in ethnic terms. From an economic perspective, it is also a class struggle between the poor Uyghurs and the rich Han. What complicates the Uyghur-Han relation is that it is a mixture of ethnicity and economy. The Chinese Communist Party has been proud of overthrowing oppressive classes and liberating oppressed classes within the Han ethnic group in the past decades. Today, the class issue in Xinjiang (embodied in ethnic tension) between oppressed Uyghur and oppressor Han, coupled with international forces and influences, is a real test for China’s proletariat party if it truly represents the oppressed people, be it Uyghur or Han.

After the July 5th event in Xinjiang, the recent Khotan attack is another open confrontation between some Uyghurs and the Chinese police in Khotan city. There are basically two interpretations of this event: (1) the WUC headed Uyghur organizations claims that this incident is resulted from Chinese police fired at a peaceful Uyghur demonstration; (2) the Chinese authority states that this is a “serious” terrorist attack, rhetoric familiar to China watchers and Islam scholars.

No more “ism,” but Neighborhood Committee
The two narratives presented by the Uyghur organizations and the Chinese state-media simply express two isms that characterize the event: one is democracy and the other is terrorism. According to sources available now, what seems to be sure is that the attackers are bearded young people from either Kashgar or Aksu or both with limited Chinese language ability. In other words, the attackers are vagrants and illiterate in Chinese. It is better to start analyzing this event by thinking the word “vagrant” here. Why are the Uyghurs from outside Khotan called vagrant in Xinjiang? The word “vagrant” in this context expresses negative connotation, meaning some Uyghurs’ presence in Khotan is illegal, which in turn indicates tight control by the local police of the movement of the individual Uyghurs in Xinjiang. To blame the outsiders to ignite the violence began to form a general pattern among China’s “anti-terror experts” to explain the violence committed by the Uyghurs, as clearly seen after the July 5th event.

Unlike other terrorists who selected high-value targets such as NYC or Mumbai, these Khotan “terrorists” strangely attacked a local police station in a remote oasis city. Why local police station? Xinjiangreview has presented the stated duties of local law enforcement offices in Xinjiang (as exemplified by a Neighborhood Committee in Kashgar, see article on Xinjiangreview, “Ten Duties of A Neighborhood Committee”) (interesting, the so-called police stationed attacked is actually a Neighborhood Committee 纳尔巴格街道办事处). These duties and power range from population registration/ID check to passport application control. Since Khotan is a smaller city compared to Kashgar, the duties of a police station primarily include the duties of a neighborhood committee in Kashgar. This analyst is not interesting in seeing how many open or hidden duties a police station carries on in Khotan. It is curious to ask how does a police station handle the violator of the state, provincial, and local regulations?

For people living in northwest China, not to mention Xinjiang or Tibet, the corruption of a police station is an open secret. Guanxi, bribe, fine, dinner, and other forms of money-making and friend-making define, interpret, and implement the laws at local level. For local police, the more trouble-makers they identify and arrest, the more fine and ransom they earn. To northwest minority population, it is not surprising that the local police station is attacked.

People may wonder how could a local police station in northwest China (esp Xinjiang) committee corruption to such a degree as to act as a black society? The answer is that the police station masters political economy — they excel at how and when to deploy even develop “sensitive” issues such as the so-called three forces of “terrorism” “extremism” and “separatism” to enrich themselves by exploiting the locals on the one hand and by applying funding from the state on the other. This corruption pattern not only fits the local police station in Xinjiang, it actually fits China’s all interest groups in Xinjiang who have a share in the so-called anti-“three evil forces” campaign, ranging from project/funding-minded academics to fine-collecting police to CCP’s central committee membership contending politicians. The Khotan incident indicates that the attackers targets what they are familiar with and, therefore, hate most, the Chinese police station. It is not a high-value target or symbolical marker and certainly does not represent an ideological ambition, be it terrorism or extremism.

Neighborhood Committee: to serve people or to suppress people?
China economists have familiar with the three divisions of China’s economic zone in terms of economic development, namely, the developed coastal/east China, developing central China, and under-developed northwest China. However, there is no discussion on the division of political zones in China at all. From a perspective of law enforcement and degree of liberty, democracy, and freedom, there are many divisions of political zones in China: Han/nonHan coastal (east) China, Han central China, non-Han central China, Han northwest, non-Han northwest, Han Xinjiang, Uyghur Xinjiang, Han Tibet, non-Han Tibet, and etc.

Citizen rights that people have enjoyed in contemporary China are different depending on their location and ethnicity. The area where the differentiated treatment of China’s citizenship is mostly reflected is the passport control. This is because in the context of globalization, more and more China’s citizens, be them Han or non-Han, tend to go abroad for various reasons. For Muslims, Uyghur, Hui, and others, passport is necessary to make a Hajj possible, one of the five pillars of their religion. By China’s constitution and laws, all citizens residing in China in theory should have equal access to the passport except the convicted. In reality, however, in Beijing, one can obtain one’s passport within 7 work days or 1 week; in central China, one may obtain one’s passport from 2 weeks to 3 months, depending on one’s ethnicity and destiny; in northwest, one may get one’s passport from 1 to 6 months, depending on one’s ethnicity, Time (to avoid Hajj time), and destiny (to avoid Islamic countries); in Xinjiang, one may never get one’s passport as long as he/she is a Uyghur.

My (non-Han) friend’s parents from northwest China deposited ￥ 1000 to apply for passport even to visit my friend in the U.S. and the “deposit” is never returned. For those Muslims who have no guanxi and/or extra money for bribe, there is no hope to go abroad at all. In this context, one can understand the desperate psychology of common Muslims whose body movement has been tightly controlled by local police station. It seems that the violence in Xinjiang will never end as long as there is endless corruption among local police; although the violence of this kind is understood primarily in grand terms of ism, the nature of the conflict between the Uyghur and the “Han” (“state”) seems to be more materilistic and local than ideological and nationalistic.

A definition of 街道办事处, source: Wikipedia
街道办事处
维基百科，自由的百科全书
街道办事处，习惯上简称为街道办、街办等，是中国大陆地区的市辖区和不设区的市政府的派出机关[1]，“街道办事处”管辖区域称为“街道”，街道一般与乡和镇处同一行政区划层次（即属于乡级区划，副省级城市的街道办与县处同一行政区划层次）。根据民政部统计，截至2004年12月31日，中国大陆全境有街道5,904个[2]。
由于中国大陆地区城市化进程的加快，有很多县份相继设置街道作为行政区划单位，渐渐朝“市建制”转变。如2009年9月，湖南省长沙县撤销星沙镇，设立星沙、湘龙、泉塘3个街道办事处[3]；重庆丰都县设有名山街道办事处、山东高唐县设有鱼丘湖街道办事处、广东龙门县设有龙城街道办事处等。有些地级市的辖区的行政机构用“区办事处”来代替区政府职能，如广东东莞莞城区办事处、中山石岐区办事处等。此外，很多地区伴随经济快速增长，城市化进程加快，最具典型的为北京近郊乡镇，这些地区仍旧保留原来的乡镇建制，乡镇政府加挂“地区办事处”牌子，乡镇以下的区划单位以社区为主。

中华人民共和国
行政区划

省级行政区

省

自治区

直辖市

特别行政区

地级行政区

地区／盟（行政公署）

自治州

地级市

显示▼县级行政区
县／旗

自治县／自治旗

县级市

市辖区

特区

林区

显示▼乡级行政区
乡／苏木（人民政府）

民族乡／民族苏木（人民政府）

镇（人民政府）

街道（办事处）
县辖区／努图克（公所）

显示▼附：基层群众自治组织
行政村（村民委员会）/嘎查

社区（居民委员会）

▼

历年街道办事处的数量
1986年以来街道数量列表

年份 街道
1986年 5718
1994年 5372
1995年 5596
1996年 5565
1997年 5678
2000年 5902
2001年 5972
2002年 5516
2003年 5751
2004年 5904

The most involved and affected groups are the majority populations in Xinjiang, namely, the Uyghurs and the Han. It is understandable that there are basically two narratives about the violence in Xinjiang. The first and dominant narrative comes from the Han, as narrated by the Chinese state, attributes the violence to the Uyghurs, specifically to what the Chinese state (Han) calls the three evil forces (terrorism, extremism, and separatism).

According to Chinese state sources suddenly released after the occurrence of the September 11th event in the U.S. in 2001, the ambiguous “Dong-tu” or “East Turkistan”(s) forces have committed a serious of terrorist acts including bus bombings in Beijing and Urumuqi. However, to the U.S., the Uyghur forces that are believed to have engaged in terrorism are exclusively pointed to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement or its various derivations (ETIM).

Interestingly enough, after the July 5th event, the Chinese government, although continuously accuses “Tu-Dong” (ETIM?) forces, specifies another group as the major actors in this violence. The new force or actor after the July 5th event, identified by China’s official media and academia is Yi-zha-bu-te (伊扎布特), or (Hizb) Tahrir, which can be directly translated as Islamic Liberation Party. The identification of Uyghur participants in the July 5th event with this group seems to be reported by a Uyghur reporter, Harat （海莱特）who himself was later on arrested and jailed in China. According to his assessment, there were several hundred Hizb Tahrir members in early 1990s in Xinjiang and this number reaches to more than 20, 000 today(http://www.zaobao.com/special/feature/pages/feature090727a.shtmlr).

It is probably according to this and other beliefs and assessment, China’s major scholars on Xinjiang tend to concentrate on Yi-zha-tu-te organization. University professors in Beijing, Nanjing, Lanzhou, and, of course, Urumuqi, began to deploy the new terminology to develop China’s own theory of anti-terrorism. According to some researchers, each Yi-zha-bu-te member suddenly received ￥ 3000 to 5000 in their bank account before the July 5th as the paycheck for their participation in the July 5th event.

In addition to these two forces, religious extremism and terrorism (ETIM or Hizb Tahrir), the Chinese government also accuses overseas Uyghurs, especially Ms. Rabir Kadeer, of igniting the violence. The major evidence of alleged Ms. Kadeer’s participation in the July 5th event is her phone call to his relatives before the July 5th that, according to Chinese media, she informed her relatives that something would happen soon. This “evidence” was supposedly reinforced by the later confessions of her Xinjiang relatives.

The so-called three forces from Chinese perspective thus find ETIM, Yi-zha-bu-te, and Ms. Kadeer as the major anchors. These accusations begin to associate the current “three evil forces” to modern Xinjiang history, from the Yabub Khanate of the late 19th century to East Turkistan Republics (ETRs) in 1930s and 1940s. Thus, a coherent ideology and chronology of separatism, extremism, and terrorism is presented by Han scholars.

Likewise, the Uyghur have accused and condemned Chinese evil forces that are believed to contribute to the current situation of Xinjiang. These evil forces can be roughly summarized as:
Han immigration: Although the history of Han immigration to Xinjiang can be traced as early as the Han dynasty according to the Chinese side, the Uyghurs accusation of the Han immigration often concentrates on the modern period when the Communist regime has systematically changed Xinjiang population structure by implementing immigration policies and institutions such as the establishment of the Xinjiang Construction and Development Corps.

These newcomers have quickly occupied Xinjiang resources due to their various affiliations with the state apparatus and nepotism (as represented by Wang Lequan’s nepotism and his wife’s enterprise in Xinjiang). As complementary part of the Han immigration into Xinjiang, the Uyghurs have also been systematically emigrated from Xinjiang. This population change strategy finally causes the Shaoguan incident in 2009, which in turn ignites the 7/5 event at home of Urumuqi. All sectors of the Uyghur societies have consistently and repeatedly criticized this population change strategy (the best analogy to this population politics in Xinjiang is the Israeli settlement in occupied territories of Palestine), as seen in the latest Jihadist video

http://jihadology.net/2011/05/23/%E1%B9%A3awt-al-islam-presents-a-new-video-message-from-%E1%B8%A5izb-al-islami-al-turkistani-turkestan-islamic-party-message-to-the-chinese-people/

The second evil force from the Chinese side, as condemned by the Uyghurs and the international community, is the Chinese social and cultural assimilation of the Uyghurs. Again, this is two-folded policy: on the one hand, the Han culture and language education has been vigorously and forcefully implemented in various regions of Xinjiang. On the other hand, the Uyghur culture and tradition including Mashrap have been brutally suppressed in the name of maintaining security and stability in Xinjiang. This cultural assimilation attempt is most criticized by Uyghur intellectuals and Muslim groups.

The ultimate goal of these population, economic, cultural politics is to totally assimilate the Uyghurs into Han majoratian society. However, the Xinjiang issue involves more than Han and the Uyghurs. Many other peoples residing in and out Xinjiang have also been affected. Therefore, it is necessary to think about the Xinjiang issue from a third perspective, which should take consideration of several general factors that can be applied to all China’s citizens:

The first question is: is China a Han nation or multi-ethnic country? Although the Chinese states since the 1912 have rhetorically claimed that China is a country of 5 peoples and of 56 ethnicities, respectively in the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China, some Han ethnic centralism and chauvinism have been clear in major social, political, and ethnicity theories. As modern China’s sociologist and anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong, famously theorizes and equates China with Chinese/Han Nation (中华民族) and argues that other peoples (should) have affiliated (and assimilate) to the major body of the Han (汉族为主体的多元一体). This assimilationist theory of and approach to ethnic issues in contemporary China is to encourage the Han and Han culture as the state (such as the cult of Confucius and worship of ancestor of the Han such as 黄帝) while to marginalize and even illegalize minority cultural and historical practices such as Uyghur Mashrap as alien and even evil.

The cultural approach to China’s nation building neglects keys issues facing all minority populations in China: who are China’s citizen and who constitutes the Chinese state. It is widely known that ethnic minorities such as the Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hui, and others have difficulty, if not access to, in applying for a passport at local region. Local public security office and religious and ethnic bureaus have relentlessly exploited the local minorities by receiving bribes and “deposits” when they apply for passport and other governmental documents. The existence of ultra militia in Xinjiang such as the Construction and Development Corps is regarded as normal and rewarded for their alleged contribution to local stability, without seeing the real nature of monopolizing local resources and justifying that monopoly in the name of maintaining security and stability. Even at the local level of law enforcement, the policemen openly favor and side with the Han to attack and arrest the Uyghurs after the July 5th event, as seen in the recent video.

http://news.backchina.com/viewnews-146929-gb2312.html

These issues, beyond ideological accusations, debates, and speculation, impose real challenges to the stability and harmony of Xinjiang. To achieve the prosperity and stability in Xinjiang, one has to start by asking: is China Han’s China? Are the Uyghur and other non-Han minority peoples second-class citizens of this country?

Why is the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee, instead of the National Development and Reform Commission, administering the economic development of Xinjiang? The following article is a response to the appointment of Wang Lequan as Deputy Chair of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee. The implications of this appointment on CCP policy toward Xinjiang are also addressed.

The appointment of Wang Lequan, Xinjiang Communist Party chief since December 1995, to the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee in Beijing has generated a good deal of discussion and debate among Xinjiang scholars and China watchers. Wang, originally from Shandong, has been succeeded by Zhang Chunxian, the former party secretary of his native Hunan Province (For an analysis of Han Chinese officials of Henan/Shandong origin in Xinjiang, see “Ningxia/Hui and Xinjiang/Uyghur: A Comparison” in http://www.xinjiangreview.com). Zhang is known for establishing a liberal economic policy in Hunan. He is also known for being a good communicator open to “creative” ideas, at least according to Vice President Xi Jinping. There is reason to hope that Zhang will lead the region in a new direction by implementing more liberal policies with a focus on tolerance and economic development.

To what extent will this changing of the guard result in policy reform in Xinjiang? The forthcoming policy changes are unknown to all but the secretive CCP politburo, but there is some evidence of a shift in the CCP’s Xinjiang strategy from political domination to economic development. Certain activities reinforce the belief that a policy shift is being effected, namely the formation of a Xinjiang work team and the initiation of a Xinjiang work conference. During this latter forum, many proposals and policies were discussed and publicized. Of potential vast importance, Kashgar has been anointed as a Special Economic Zone. This move has prompted some in the popular media to predict that Kashgar will emerge as a strategic center of commerce – the Shenzhen of Central Asia.

These official re-appointments, the Xinjiang work conference, along with a succession of CCP delegations from China proper to Xinjiang reinforce the impression that the CCP is advancing a strategic and serious change in its Xinjiang policy. These movements indicate that, as heralded by the Chinese media and officials, the “solution” to the Xinjiang “problem” is economic development. As a show of commitment to ameliorate the poor economy of the region, a significant aid package has been prepared. By undertaking these efforts, the Chinese government hopes to maintain the stability and unity of Xinjiang.

Despite these reappointments, proclamations and promises of economic assistance, there is reason to remain skeptical of these motions. The CCP is an authoritarian and paternalistic form of government and regional party secretaries are subordinate to Beijing. Therefore, a change in face should not be mistaken for a change in ideology. And although Wang Lequan was dethroned in Xinjiang, his reassignment as Deputy Chair of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee was not a demotion. This new role in a powerful CCP committee will allow him to form policies to be implemented in Xinjiang. Moreover, his new position will allow him to play a prominent role as architect of economic construction and reform in Xinjiang. This is unusual because CCP strategic economic plans are typically administered by the National Development and Reform Commission, not the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee. Even more ironic is that Wang Lequan is the acting team leader in the newly organized Xinjiang work team.

These circumstances raise serious questions on the future of Xinjiang: Why is the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee instead of the National Development and Reform Commission administering economic development in Xinjiang? Why is Wang Lequan leading the work team that is overseeing economic reform in Xinjiang? Has the CCP’s Xinjiang policy been reformulated, or have the rulers simply passed the mantle of repression? If change has been embraced, will the new policies reverse the intolerance and subsequent ethnic discord of the past? These questions demand complex answers as they necessitate a critical evaluation of past policy failures.

(For a Chinese-language covering of Wang Lequan’s dictatorship and corruption in Xinjiang, see http://www.aboluowang.com/news/data/2009/0710/article_80867.html)

Since September 11, China has put the blame for a series of terrorist attacks in China, including ones in Beijing and Ürümqi, on the “three Uyghur forces” of extremism, separatism, and terrorism. The U.S. strike against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, China and the United States labeling the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization, and the subsequent capture of Uyghur “fighters” in Afghanistan, have allowed China to link the Uyghurs to Al-Qaeda.

Following several years of inhumane torture and illegal detention at Guantanamo Bay prison, those Uyghur fighters were found not to be enemy combatants. But while the U.S. is close to victory over Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan following the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, China seems to be stepping up its rhetoric and action in the so-called “war on terror” in China and beyond.

In July 2010, China and Pakistan held a joint counter-terrorist military exercise in Qingtong Xia (青铜峡 or Blue-bronze gorge) in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Chinese officials and experts attribute the choice of this region to its geographic and topographic proximity to the Sino-Pakistan border. But culturally, socially, and religiously Ningxia is another autonomous region like Xinjiang, dominated by a Muslim population. To locate such a joint military exercise in a Muslim area indicates an extension of China’s “war on terror” from Xinjiang Uyghus to Ningxia Hui.
(Another article on xinjiangreview.com analyzes proposals by China’s “anti-terror experts” or “project professors” for an “anti-three forces project” in Ningxia.)

In May 2011, China staged the second joint “Tianshan No. 2″ anti-terror military exercise together with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Chinese media and officials openly claim that East Turkestani terrorists cross the borders from Central Asia into China. Interestingly, only southwest Central Asian countries took part in this exercise. Kazakhstan and Russia, located in the region’s northwest, were notably absent.

This suggests that China’s prolonged “anti-terrorism” strategy may turn out to be one of the rules of a new great game in Central Asia between China, Russia, and India, and a number of outside influencers, including the United States. China is strengthening its ties with its southwestern SCO neighbors while Russia and Kazakhstan also seem to be forming a bloc within the SCO, for example by means of a customs union. Former Soviet Central Asia is likely to be dominated by China in the southwest and Russia in the northwest.

The assassination of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan did not win much applause in China. This isn’t because China stands by some moral principle that sanctions terrorism or assassinations, but because Obama’s announcement of the death of Osama greatly undermines Chinese claims of links between Uyghur terrorists, Al-Qaeda, and by extension the Taliban.
The same is also true for China’s support for Pakistan in it’s war on terror. Immediately after the assassination of Osama Bin Laden by the Obama administration, it was reported and now is confirmed that China will provide 50 JF-17 jets to the Pakistani air force within a few weeks. The next development, that China will take over operations at the Gwadar port at the request of the Pakistani government, followed on the heels of the announcement of intensified military cooperation. These developments reveal China’s strategic consideration of Pakistan’s role in “anti-terrorism” now and in the future.

It is clear that China is strengthening economic and military relationships with countries neighboring Kashgar, and reinforcing it’s relationship with Pakistan, in order to build a safe zone from Kashgar to Gwadar. The Kashgar-Gwadar corridor is important to China not only to gain access to energy from the gulf, but also to cut off Indian access to southern Central Asia. The “war on terror” is increasingly turning into a strategic ideology and a weapon for launching a new great game among former and rising powers in Central Asia.