一个国家的公安机关居然从事的是驱逐一个和朋友们聚会,交流中正伊斯兰教的加拿大国籍的华人。西北新疆化真不是笑话。__1 (1)

Freedom of Expression for Some

Posted: 2014年09月30日 in Other authors



Chinese Academic Given Life in Prison for Uyghur Website; Radical Han Separatist and Nationalist Web Site Flourishes


The sentencing of a Uyghur economics professor, Ilham Tohti, on September 23 shocked many people including human rights groups and scholars of Xinjiang studies. Mr. Tohti, a critic of China’s policies in Xinjiang, and an advocate of Uyghur-Han dialogue, has been found guilty of separatism.

While not entirely unexpected, it came as a shock that a Beijing-based professor could be convicted primarily because of his management of a web forum, Uighurbiz.net — a site that in fact, far from advocated separatism, but encouraged dialogue.

With a focus on China’s Xinjiang policies and on Uyghur culture, history, economics, and other areas of inquiry, Uighurbiz included Tohti’s opinions, commentaries, and translated or re-posted articles about Uyghurs or other minority nationalities in China. Uighurbiz.net was widely regarded as a bridge for connecting the Uyghurs and the (ethnically Chinese) Han, for promoting mutual understanding between them, and for seeking better policies in Xinjiang.

It should also be highlighted that what Mr. Tohti did was completely within the bounds of China’s Constitution and other legal frameworks.

Human Rights Watch China director Sophie Richardson wrote in an op-ed, “Tohti has consistently, courageously, and unambiguously advocated peacefully for greater understanding and dialogue between various communities, and with the state. If this is Beijing’s definition of ‘separatist’ activities, it’s hard to see tensions in Xinjiang and between the communities decreasing.”

While the web site had been transferred from a domestic to an overseas server at one point, it is no longer functioning. The last posts on the site, nearly a year ago (10/10/2013) were a short piece by Tohti offering congratulations on the Muslim festival of Eid Kurban, and an article stating that one of his students was arrested and forced to lie about Professor Tohti. (It’s not clear whether Tohti himself had taken the website offline or whether it was shut down by the government. Using the Wayback Machine, it’s archived here: http://web.archive.org/web/20131019093409/http://www.uighurbiz.net/)

It’s also important to point out that both the separatism charge and the punishment Tohti received – life in prison — is much more severe than what the majority of Han political dissidents have received. It’s a heavy-handed response.

As Maya Wang, a researcher from Human Rights Watch, told The New York Times, she could not recall any Han Chinese advocates or dissidents receiving a life sentence in recent years.

This is confirmed by leading academics on Xinjiang. Georgetown University Prof. James Millward mentioned in his timely op-ed in The New York Times that the sentence was longer than those given to other Chinese dissidents.

Tohti’s conviction in particular — that of a Uyghur scholar for a personal Beijing-based web forum he managed — indicates a shift in the (Chinese-run) Xinjiang government’s suppression pattern. It appears to be a new tactic for cracking down on Uyghur dissidents: going after their websites and accusing and in some cases convicting them, mostly falsely, of separatist activities.

Why the shift in framing and tactics?

The Xinjiang government had long attributed the source of violent protest in Xinjiang to Afghanistan, Syria, Chechnya, Pakistan, or other Muslim majority regions or countries, but so far not a single Uyghur attacker accused of recent attacks in Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi, Shache, and other places, has been found to have such alleged international connections.

So it’s not surprising that following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States, the Chinese and Xinjiang governments started blaming a homegrown terrorist group — the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, ETIM) — for igniting unrest in Xinjiang.

Interestingly, the very existence of ETIM (and later TIP) is in question. The U.S removed ETIM from it’s terrorist organization watch list. This made China’s accusations that ETIM was the source of Xinjiang unrest difficult. In recent years, China shifted from blaming ETIM as an organization to claiming ETIM/TIP audio-video propaganda was motivating the unrest.

To say that Uyghurs were incited to violent attacks based on this propaganda, is a weak connection at best. Without considering that the government’s exclusionary policies toward Uyghurs might be at least partially to blame (extensively detailed in ISLAMiCommentary and by many Western journalists), the Xinjiang government now seems focused on cracking down on so-called “separatist” Uyghur web forums that they see as advocating separatism, terrorism, and extremism.

The Xinjiang government went to Beijing and arrested Mr. Tohti in order to prove that there is a “mastermind” or “ideologue” behind the unrest in Xinjiang. The government even went so far as to accuse Mr. Tohti and his website contributors of the July 5th riot in Urumqi in 2009 that caused the death of hundreds of people. (The Xinjiang government had previously accused the World Uyghur Congress and its leader Rebiya Kadeer as being behind the July 5th riot. Perhaps that didn’t stick.)

While Mr. Tohti was sentenced primarily for his running of a reasonably moderate, though critical, web forum on the Uyghurs and Xinjiang, many prolific Han ultra-nationalist websites have openly advocated Han racism, Han chauvinism, Han militarism, and even Han separatism by spreading hate speech against non-Han peoples.

The site http://www.huanghanzu.com (literally, “Heavenly Han” people) presents the most radical cultural attacks and portrayals of non-Han peoples, including foreigners such as Jews, people of color, and Chinese minorities such as the Uyghurs and the Hui Muslims.

While Prof. Tohti has called for dialogue and cooperation between the Uyghurs and the Han, http://www.huanghanzu.com publicly discusses the extermination of “evil Jews” who have dominated the World (including in Hong Kong), elimination of “dirty Negros” in Guangzhou, the expulsion of Muslims from China, and the “cleansing” of Han traitors and Han women who have “dirtied” themselves by being easily accessible to foreigners, and the like.

The forum manager is “Da Han Wu Di” (literally, “Great Han without matching enemy” or simply “undefeatable Great Han”), and most articles or comments on this web site have supported hate crimes, racism, or anti-Semitism.

Compared to Mr. Tohti’s Uighurbiz.net, Huanghanzu.com not only supports racism, but also advocates Han separatism by spreading hatred against non-Han peoples. If Mr. Tohti is being punished primarily for his Uighurbiz site, why doesn’t the “Undefeatable Han” get jailed for his “Heavenly Han” website ?

One could argue that Beijing is not censoring that site because it believes in freedom of expression. But, as is evident in the case of Tohti and Uighurbiz.net, the government doesn’t advocate freedom of expression for all.

It is China’s suppression of Uighurbiz and it’s punishment of the site’s manager, together with it’s refusal to censor the Huanghan forum, that reflects a dangerous social and cultural tendency. Punishing non-Han intellectuals for their expression of dissatisfaction only enlivens Han nationalism and bolsters Han separatism and racism, which is not a good sign for China’s minority populations and the government’s stated commitment to their rights under China’s Constitution and Ethnic Regional Autonomous Law.

Haiyun Ma teaches in the history department at Frostburg State University in Maryland. His teaching and research interests are Chinese History, Islam and Muslims of China (including Xinjiang), China-Middle East relations, and China-Central Asian Relations. He is an expert on China-Middle East relations at the Middle East Institute, and a regular contributor to ISLAMiCommentary.

I-wei Jennifer Chang is a D.C.-based writer and researcher on China, with an MA in international relations from the University of Maryland. Her research interests include Sino-Gulf relations, U.S.-China relations, Chinese foreign and security policies, China’s oil security, ethnic conflict, and U.S. foreign policy. She has conducted fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai, interviewing numerous Chinese scholars, think-tank researchers, and former ambassadors.

Macao daily


伊帕爾 · 艾爾肯 (新疆)







我們的國家──中國已巍然屹立東方,世人刮目相看,她用巨手撫摸裂痕,回望昨日之輝煌,也拾起痛苦的記憶碎片;歷史長河滾滾東流,那一顆赤心換來五星紅旗飄揚;澳門島上盛開的金蓮花, “一國兩制”譜寫希望之光。全新的時代等着我們去開創,把握和平橄欖枝,鑄劍為犁。當我離開澳門之時,我對澳門說:“請允許我把你也當作我的故鄉。請允許我把你的大三巴、媽閣廟和小巷榕樹,都記在我心上。”
伊帕爾 · 艾爾肯


Last week, a court in China’s far western Xinjiang region sentenced Ilham Tohti, a member of the Uighur minority, to life in prison for the crime of “inciting separatism.” The conviction of this moderate scholar elicited international condemnation; the sentence was an order of magnitude longer than those given to other Chinese dissidents. But, far from being a show of strength, the sentence is a sign of the confusion and desperation behind the government’s policies toward Uighurs.

That Mr. Tohti, an economics professor and a blogger, should become a celebrated political prisoner is a paradox, for he is in many ways a poster child for what the Communist Party hopes more Uighurs will become. Educated, and eloquent in Mandarin, he was a party member from a family closely engaged with the state (his male relatives include members of China’s military and state security organs). He is professional, entrepreneurial and middle class (his family assets amounted to around $130,000 before state confiscation). He is not outwardly religious (most Uighurs are Muslims, but vary in the degree and nature of their observance). He is distinctive mainly in his outspokenness.

Though the Chinese often think of Xinjiang as a remote frontier of deserts and mountains, populated with quaint folkloric natives, it is closely linked to the rest of China and to Central Asia by an expanding transportation infrastructure; the skyscrapers, neon glow, booming commerce and air pollution of Xinjiang’s cities resemble those elsewhere in China; and although, like rural areas throughout the country, Xinjiang’s villages remain poor, the emerging middle class in the cities is scarcely different from its counterparts in other urban centers. Rapid economic development has benefited Uighurs as well as Han Chinese (each group makes up just over 40 percent of the region’s population of 21 million).

Yet the authorities seem puzzled and frustrated that, despite these economic gains, Uighurs remain adamantly Uighur. Sporadic local disturbances are endemic throughout China, but in Xinjiang they are colored by ethno-national and religious sentiments. After a relatively quiet decade, from 1998 to 2007, stability has eroded alarmingly since 2008, with a big, bloody race riot in 2009, sporadic attacks on police stations and representatives of the state and, over the past year, violence perpetrated by Uighurs against random civilians in Urumqi, the regional capital, and in faraway Yunnan Province and Beijing. Xinjiang authorities have responded to violence with an intense crackdown, including house-to-house searches, and a campaign against traditional symbols of identity: veils, head scarves, beards, traditional hats, Ramadan fasting, prayer.

Combined with the recent razing of Uighur architecture in the ancient city of Kashgar and elimination of the Uighur-language educational track from Xinjiang’s schools and universities, these measures seem aimed at repressing Uighur culture. Moreover, the authorities have now doubled down on their post-9/11 tendency to interpret Uighur unrest through a single lens — foreign-inspired Islamic “terrorism” — even when the real causes are local and political.

Continue reading the main storyContinue reading the main story
It is unclear if China’s leaders entirely believe their own propaganda — that all Uighur troubles derive from external sources and are unrelated to government policies — but local and regional authorities certainly benefit from it: Whereas common people elsewhere in China enjoy some de facto freedom to protest official and business malfeasance, Uighurs enjoy no such latitude. In the absence of a free press, Beijing has few sources of on-the-ground information in Xinjiang other than its own self-interested and self-protecting local officials, who can readily justify their mistakes and abuses in the name of fighting “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” No surprise, then, that it was the authorities in Xinjiang, not Beijing, who were most eager to prosecute Mr. Tohti, for he has been arguing that Chinese policies themselves, not simply cyber-radicalization, have been engendering Uighur resentment and violence.

Yet by condemning Mr. Tohti, Beijing has not only subjected itself yet again to international opprobrium, but has denied itself a critical Uighur viewpoint and an alternative approach to the deteriorating situation in Xinjiang. Before it was shut down, Mr. Tohti’s Uighurbiz website was a forum for Han and Uighur contributors to discuss Xinjiang issues, bridging the two communities; the need for more interethnic communication was a theme when the Communist Party issued revised Xinjiang policy guidelines last May.

Most important, Mr. Tohti pointed out that China’s own existing laws could protect minority cultures — if only they were observed. He did not call for a radical American-style democratization, but rather for the protection of indigenous institutions — support for non-Han cultural expression, job opportunities and truly “autonomous” government administration — that is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and a 1984 law.

This system of “ethnic autonomy” was indirectly derived from the pluralist (though not democratic) ideology of the Qing empire (1644-1911), which first brought Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia and Taiwan under Beijing’s rule as a “great family under Heaven.” Though superficially resembling the system of national republics undergirding the Soviet Union, the system developed by the People’s Republic of China differed in substantial ways and was adapted to Chinese conditions and outlooks. It functioned successfully in the 1950s, when Xinjiang was designated the “Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” and again in the early 1980s, and it remains popular with minority groups even though they have never been afforded real autonomy. Far from “inciting separatism,” Mr. Tohti was advocating a return to foundational promises dating to Mao’s era.

Management of diversity and pluralism is a pressing world issue, from Scotland to Ukraine to Ferguson, Mo. China has an opportunity to contribute its own fixes to the bugs in the nation-state model, but cannot do so by locking up its most creative and courageous thinkers.

上周,中国西部边陲新疆的一家法院,以“分裂国家”的罪名判处伊力哈木·土赫提(Ilham Tohti)无期徒刑。伊力哈木是维吾尔族人。对这位温和的学者判刑,引发了国际社会的谴责,他被判处的刑期也比其他中国异见人士长出一个数量级。然而这一判决显示的绝非力量,而是政府对维吾尔人的政策背后的混乱和慌张。










James A. Millward, a professor of history at Georgetown, is the author of “Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang” and “The Silk Road: A Very Short Introduction.”


Challenging Uyghur Muslim Identity: More Enforcement, Worse Results

Publication: China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 17September 10, 2014 04:39 PM Age: 26 min
By: Haiyun Ma, I-wei Jennifer Chang

Uyghurs fasting while observing Ramadan. (Credit: Al Jazeera)
Following deadly attacks in Beijing, Kunming and Urumqi over the last year, the Xinjiang government has intensified its efforts to regulate Uyghur religious activities. The provincial government has once again reinforced its ban on Ramadan fasting for Uyghur civil servants and students in 2014, as it has frequently done since at least 2001. Xinjiang has been developing its own policies to discourage Uyghur religious activities and decrease their observance of Islam since 1994, with the promotion of Wang Lequan to provincial Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary. However, these policies have become increasingly counterproductive, as Uyghurs have reinforced their religious identity as a way of resistance, either peacefully or violently.

Ramadan Ban

During this year’s holy month of Ramadan in June and July, the fasting ban focused mainly on Uyghur elites, such as civil servants, Party members and students, as local government agencies, state-run companies and public schools required or encouraged Uyghurs to break their fast by eating during the day. At the beginning of the holy month, ethnic-religious and United Front officials in Hami (Qumul in Uyghur) held meetings on how to strengthen control over fasting during Ramadan (Hami Government, June 30). Leveraging their control over Uyghur Party cadres, local governments provided free meals for lunch, while cadres monitored them for compliance, namely, observing whether the Uyghurs ate their meals and thus broke their fast. Furthermore, these government institutions organized parties and celebrations offering food during the daylight hours throughout Ramadan. For example, the Tarim River Basin Management Bureau celebrated the anniversary of the founding of the CCP by holding a dinner party for its predominantly Uyghur employees on June 28, the first day of Ramadan this year (Tarim Basin Management Bureau, June 30). Similarly, the Pishan County (Guma nahiyisi in Uyghur) Industry and Commerce Bureau held “sincere conversation” meetings to prevent its Uyghur employees from fasting during Ramadan Xinjiang Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce, July 3). Additionally, Uyghur business owners were punished if they closed their shops or restaurants during the day, as is customary in many parts of the Muslim world during Ramadan.

Prior Crackdowns

Over the last 20 years, the Xinjiang provincial government has taken a leading role in regulating Chinese Uyghur citizens’ religious activities, especially under hard-line Party Secretary Wang Lequan. This year’s ban on fasting is a first, but rather is a continuation and intensification of long-standing efforts to regulate Islamic practices and identity among Uyghurs. Since the early 1990s, the Xinjiang provincial government has sought to dampen Uyghur observance of Islam by imposing various restrictions on religious activities. The Xinjiang government has instituted a series of laws, regulations and campaigns aimed at restricting Islamic practices and behaviors among Uyghurs, including the aforementioned bans on fasting during Ramadan.

The ascendance of hardliner Wang Lequan to power as Party Secretary in Xinjiang in 1994 was accompanied by targeted attacks against Uyghur Muslim identity, as the local government instituted a series of restrictive policies on religion, directly attacking Islam and focusing on Uyghurs working for the government. In 1991, Wang stated that the major task of his government was to “manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to…unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity” (Outlook, June 25, 2001, no.26, pp.52-53). In a similar statement in 2002, Wang repeated this stance when he called on his government to “oppose illegal religious activities that use religion to harm the socialist motherland and the people’s interests” (Editorial, Xinjiang Daily, October 13, 2002). Local laws and regulations affecting religion enacted under Wang’s leadership include, but are not limited to: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Religious Affairs Regulations (effective in 1994), which tightened control over religion; Document 7 (1996) that mandates state leadership over religion; Instructions (1998), which called for cadres to fight against non-governmental religious activities; and the Interim Provisions on Disciplinary Punishments for Party Members and Organs That Violate Political Disciplines in Fighting Separatism and Safeguarding Unity (2000), which directly targeted ethnic Uyghur members of the Chinese Communist Party preventing prayer, Ramadan fasting and religious studies. These measures were aimed at opposing Uyghur separatism and preventing a Central Asian-inspired independence movement following the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Xinjiang appears to have intensified its “anti-terror” campaign. Beijing labeled some Uyghur groups terrorists and justified further crackdowns on Uyghur activities as part of its counter-terrorism efforts. The September 11 attacks came shortly after the Chinese government unveiled its own campaign against the “three evils” of separatism, extremism and terrorism in April of that year. As China supported the U.S. War on Terror internationally, Xinjiang’s local policies towards Uyghurs became more aggressive and restrictive. According to Uyghur rights activists, Uyghur youths were prohibited from entering mosques, which are all state-controlled and administered. Uyghur villagers were also forbidden to pray outside of their village mosques. Local police forcefully removed veils from Uyghur women’s heads and forced Uyghur men to shave their long beards, which caused family and communal anger and conflicts with the local law enforcement offices. Uyghur families were routinely subjected to surprise break-in searches by the local police (“Sacred Rights Defiled, China’s Iron-Fisted Repression of Uyghur Religious Freedom,” The Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 2013, pp.29-72). Unofficial publications of Islamic texts were deemed “pornography” by the Xinjiang government and thus targeted for confiscation and elimination.

In response to increased fear of terrorism, the provincial government discouraged Islam in general and specifically attempted to differentiate local Uyghur religious practices from that of more conservative sects, which it defines as Arab or Wahhabi. The Xinjiang government has officially designated full-body garments for woman and long beards on men as symbols of Wahhabism and the Ghulja city government, among others, have initiated several anti-Wahhabi campaigns (Yining Government, December 15, 2011). In April 2013, the government of Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture launched a training program to teach cadres how to resist the penetration of Wahhabism into Uyghur society (Guancha News, April 21, 2013).

More recently, the Xinjiang government has instituted a unique suite of religious policies aimed at Uyghurs, in contrast to the softer approaches to religion in other provinces of China. In March 2012, Uyghur civil servants and retired teachers were forced to sign agreements that they would not practice Islam (Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2012). More recently, the Xinjiang government issued a special identification card in Xinjiang to control domestic travel.

Further, Xinjiang officials appear to have taken a leading role in the development of policies towards Muslims minorities, especially under the rule of Wang Lequan from 1990s to 2010. These provincial leaders have not only made more efforts to control and confront Islam than China’s national government, but have exported these provocative policies to Muslim-populated neighboring provinces. In November 2009, the Xinjiang government announced a campaign targeting un-official and un-censored Islamic publications, called the “Tianshan Project,” spanning China’s entire northwest region including Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and Shaanxi (Xinhua, November 21, 2009).

Counter-Productive Results

Since the Xinjiang government has targeted Uyghur religious activities, Uyghurs unhappy with government restrictions on religion are likely to unify behind their Islamic identity, which serves as a political symbol of anti-Chinese resistance. As recent violent attacks indicate, the repressive religious policies have led Uyghur attackers to aggressively assert their Islamic religion by using religious symbols in their recent attacks, likely in the hopes of mobilizing their fellows Uyghurs to resist Xinjiang’s repressive religious policies. According to Chinese media, perpetrators of major attacks at Tiananmen Square and the Kunming railway station carried Shahada-bearing flags, a symbol of Islamic faith not previously seen during violent incidents involving Uyghurs. Xinjiang’s repressive policies towards Uyghur religion have produced counter-productive results for the government by contributing to the political and social alienation of elite Ughurs, religious revitalization among secular Uyghurs, and even radicalization of some Uyghurs.

These events appear to reflect a growing trend of Uyghur resistance that is likely exacerbated by current Xinjiang local provincial policies. More importantly, since Uyghur cadres bear the brunt of the religious regulations, they are forced to choose between their religious identity as Muslims and their occupation as CCP officials. This complicates their role as a bridge between the atheist CCP and the larger Uyghur population. The restrictions on religious expression among Uyghur elites have pushed them far from the state and closer to their own group, which will likely further polarize Xinjiang societal relations between the Uyghurs and the Han.




发言人: 张海洋中央民族大学教授,博士生导师,中央民族大学中国少数民族研究中心主任







还有历史,中国的历史本来就很丰富,但用汉人王朝的历史,你就只能说明东面沿海这一块地方。西部边疆地方,你就是要多用满、蒙、维、藏的语言文字才能说得更全面。现在主流社会不鼓励各民族自己编写历史,怕他们把族源的根子追到国境外面去。这是“南京南库” (编者注:张海洋讲南京国民政府的思想源流简称为“南库”,与北京北洋政府的思想源流“北库”相对)“小中华”的思路。其实你换用唐、元、清的思路,再用上“新丝绸之路”的思路,少数民族的历史文化追得再远,也不过就是我们正要拓展的“欧亚新丝路”包括“西南丝路”和“草原丝路”和“海上丝路”的范围。这些都是中国各民族祖先去过,子孙后代还要去去的地方。这有什么不好?你非要把大家的脑袋都锁定在中原和东南沿海又有什么好呢?















实践操作中需要这些折中,否则国家就维持不了团结和统一了。顺便问一句,大家谁能记得就是在这样“两少一宽”和“优惠政策”的背景下,马戎教师分析“六普”期间的新疆少数民族干部、农业人口和就业人口比例?又有谁敢说现在监狱里维吾尔族人口比例比汉人低了多少呢?那你喊了半天“两少一宽”和优惠政策是不是无的放矢?再说你看当今中国,两少一宽、正向行动affirmative action和民族区域自治,它是不是一个方向,是不是可欲的东西?你自己是不是也缺这个东西?如果是这样,那就先帮助别人实现这些享受,然后你自己也能跟着享受。但现在中国汉人,特别是读书人,脑袋好像进水不少,只知道“不明觉厉”而不肯“见贤思齐”,不是想法儿把自己提升到好的境界上去,而是要把好的拉下来,让它沉沦到自己的境界里。








发言人:张海洋  中央民族大学教授,博士生导师,中央民族大学中国少数民族研究中心主任



























它的最大荒唐就是这么大个国家非要学新加坡,网上说现在英语一个字典里把汉语里的“不作死就不会死”翻译成一个词叫“no zuo,no die”。现在老要学新加坡建设城邦国家,就是“作”得太厉害了。