新疆的“野”阿訇

Posted: 2014年11月25日 in Original Thoughts

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新疆的“野”阿訇

中国媒体最近报道了一则消息,新疆喀什市人民法院召开严打暴恐犯罪宣判大会,依法对22名涉暴恐的犯罪分子一审公开判决。据说上述人员分别犯煽动民族仇恨民族歧视罪、利用迷信破坏法律实施罪、聚众扰乱社会秩序罪、寻衅滋事罪、传播犯罪方法罪和强奸罪等。很显然,喀什市法院对这些人员的判处是在新疆反恐背景之下、依据两个月前由公安部公布的、由最高人民法院、最高人民检察院、公安部联合出台的《关于办理暴力恐怖和宗教极端刑事案件适用法律若干问题的意见》的指导下实施的快速判决。

根据中国国内的报道,这次公开宣判的罪犯分为三类:一是被群众称为“野阿訇”的非法讲经人员,二是已被撤免宗教职务、仍然在从事非法宗教活动的人员;三是在职违法犯罪的宗教人士。很显然,喀什的这次宣判是对维吾尔穆斯林一特定阶层的判决,主要是征对“野阿訇、”“退而不休”的阿訇、以及“渎职”的阿訇们的判决。对于这些判决,国内外宣传报道大相径庭。根据喀什市委副书记、市长艾尼瓦尔·吐尔逊的提法,此次公判是一次严厉打击涉宗教领域暴恐犯罪的重大举措,也是一次活生生的法制宣传教育大会。而国际媒体《纽约时报》等对宣判大会的仪式性、法定诉讼程序和司法程序合规性以及罪名和罪证的模糊性等表达了关注。

“野阿訇”的说法和对阿訇大规模的判决引起需要我们思考一些更为基本、更为广泛的概念和问题,诸如阿訇是什么,阿訇在中国的产生程序是怎样的,为什么会有“野阿訇,”新疆对所谓“野阿訇”的提法和集体判决对于维吾尔信众和国家之间关系走向会产生造成什么样的影响等等。作为中国穆斯林和伊斯兰教的研究者,笔者觉得有必要对这些基本的概念进行简单的梳理,有助于关心新疆问题的人士谨慎思考新疆宗教部门和宗教领袖之间的关系以及地方官僚对诸如“野阿訇”的提法和处置可能造成的影响。

简单地说,阿訇就是穆斯林宗教职业者,即我们经常所学的寺院住持等宗教人士;同时阿訇也是一种对穆斯林神学知识份子的荣誉称谓,类似于藏传佛教中的格西等誉称,也可同世俗教育中的博士、硕士等称谓。从某种程度上说,阿訇等同于“尔林”, 即穆斯林知识份子。当然,理想的阿訇是职业和知识的合二为一,即有伊斯兰知识的阿訇在宗教场所如清真寺担任一定的职位,即开学阿訇,以便引导和服务穆斯林群众。从新疆判处三类人员中的前两类来看,即所谓“野阿訇”和“退而不休”的阿訇,那么这些阿訇应该属于没有宗教职位、但却拥有知识“尔林”的民间宗教领袖。他们对维吾尔穆斯林的影响很显然不是因为他们的职位,而是他们的知识。

“野阿訇”对维吾尔穆斯林群众依然具有影响力和感召力,至少和以下几个方面的原因有关:一个阿訇的任命过程和程序,即地方政府任命的作为职业的阿訇的程序,即政府任命、指定、或批准的阿訇是不是在知识上或 “尔林”上让信众心服口服的阿訇。从目前的地方情况来看,在各种官僚化的伊斯兰教协会、宗教民族管理部门里,拉关系、走后面是很难避免的。很多情况下,操守好、有“阿林”的好阿訇无法进入需要和官僚打交道的体制内任职来引导群众。在当下中国的民族宗教管理问题上,尤其是在阿訇作为一种职业的任命问题上为“野阿訇”的存在、甚至尊崇创造了人为的空间。从某种意义上来说,“野阿訇”的出现是中国宗教部门的管理问题,即没有建设一个可以将所有的宗教知识份子纳入一个公平竞争阿訇岗位的平台和机制。

另外,在任何宗教来看,学派、教派分野是无法避免的。即使在没有腐败的官僚管理体制之内任命真正具有学识和操守的阿訇在一部分信众眼里也会存在争议。职业上“下野”的阿訇很可能夸大学派、教派细节上的区别而吸引部分信众形成自己的圈子。这在具有苏菲传统的新疆土壤中很容易生根发芽。就这需要地方政府帮助创造一个平台和机制,让穆斯林阿訇和穆斯林信众从学术教理的角度出发,公开公平地选举其宗教领袖,这样穆斯林信众对阿訇赞许和政府对阿訇的的认可才能最大限度达到统合。即使在伊斯兰国家,政府对阿訇的任命是极其谨慎的,没有一个政府可以命令穆斯林应该跟随哪一个阿訇礼拜、念经。毕竟,关系任何个人的信仰正确是穆斯林信众大是大非的问题是穆斯林自己的判断,而不是说国家通过暴力机器就能强加的。

从世界宗教史的角度来看,任何对特定宗教领袖阶层的打击和处置,不但不会解决问题,反而会造成持久的、广泛的教派分化、冲突及仇恨。从中国历史的角度来看,世俗政府对宗教领袖的打压很容易造成信众与政府的直接冲突。18世纪清政府因处决“新教”哲合忍耶阿訇而激起了大规模穆斯林起义震撼了清廷并且延续了一百多年。在哲合忍野大阿訇在18世纪末被清廷处决之后,乾隆皇帝也试图禁与之有关的“野阿訇”、甚至试图消灭整个阿訇名目,这最终导致了18世纪末期、由阿訇感召的另一次起义。对当时的穆斯林来说,国家对特定“阿訇”的革除和灭绝不仅征对职业阿訇,而且也涉及更为广泛的享有“阿訇”头衔的穆斯林知识阶层甚至一般的穆斯林群众。尤其是对苏菲派别信众来说,政府(尤其是非穆斯林政府)对穆斯林宗教领袖阿訇的镇压,反面会证明其宗教领袖的正确性,从而强化他们对阿訇的尊崇,最终将国家和穆斯林信众置于一种更为紧张和持久的冲突当中。

其实,在处理宗教信众和宗教领袖与地方政府关系问题上,新疆地方政府可以从中国东部的很多开明城市和地区学习经验。从古代的泉州、广州等沿海国际都市的发展到现在的义乌等国际化城市的成长,说明只有宽容的文化宗教环境才、良好的政府和宗教人士阶层的沟通和互动才能有助于造就经济的繁荣、民众的富裕以及政府和信众之间的和谐。即使同样是穆斯林民族自治区的宁夏,其高超的宗教管理能力、和谐的民族宗教关系、稳定的政治环境和繁荣的经济正在成为中国向伊斯兰世界输出软实力的榜样。而反观新疆,其低下、粗暴的民族宗教管理方式(尤其在对待阿訇问题上)、紧张的民族宗教关系正在拖中国建设“一带一路”宏大战略的后腿。

马海云,美国马里兰霜堡大学历史系教授,专攻中国伊斯兰和穆斯林研究

一个国家的公安机关居然从事的是驱逐一个和朋友们聚会,交流中正伊斯兰教的加拿大国籍的华人。西北新疆化真不是笑话。__1 (1)

Freedom of Expression for Some

Posted: 2014年09月30日 in Other authors

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http://islamicommentary.org/2014/09/freedom-of-expression-for-some-by-haiyun-ma-and-i-wei-jennifer-chang/

Chinese Academic Given Life in Prison for Uyghur Website; Radical Han Separatist and Nationalist Web Site Flourishes

by HAIYUN MA and JENNIFER I-WEI CHANG for ISLAMiCommentary:

The sentencing of a Uyghur economics professor, Ilham Tohti, on September 23 shocked many people including human rights groups and scholars of Xinjiang studies. Mr. Tohti, a critic of China’s policies in Xinjiang, and an advocate of Uyghur-Han dialogue, has been found guilty of separatism.

While not entirely unexpected, it came as a shock that a Beijing-based professor could be convicted primarily because of his management of a web forum, Uighurbiz.net — a site that in fact, far from advocated separatism, but encouraged dialogue.

With a focus on China’s Xinjiang policies and on Uyghur culture, history, economics, and other areas of inquiry, Uighurbiz included Tohti’s opinions, commentaries, and translated or re-posted articles about Uyghurs or other minority nationalities in China. Uighurbiz.net was widely regarded as a bridge for connecting the Uyghurs and the (ethnically Chinese) Han, for promoting mutual understanding between them, and for seeking better policies in Xinjiang.

It should also be highlighted that what Mr. Tohti did was completely within the bounds of China’s Constitution and other legal frameworks.

Human Rights Watch China director Sophie Richardson wrote in an op-ed, “Tohti has consistently, courageously, and unambiguously advocated peacefully for greater understanding and dialogue between various communities, and with the state. If this is Beijing’s definition of ‘separatist’ activities, it’s hard to see tensions in Xinjiang and between the communities decreasing.”

While the web site had been transferred from a domestic to an overseas server at one point, it is no longer functioning. The last posts on the site, nearly a year ago (10/10/2013) were a short piece by Tohti offering congratulations on the Muslim festival of Eid Kurban, and an article stating that one of his students was arrested and forced to lie about Professor Tohti. (It’s not clear whether Tohti himself had taken the website offline or whether it was shut down by the government. Using the Wayback Machine, it’s archived here: http://web.archive.org/web/20131019093409/http://www.uighurbiz.net/)

It’s also important to point out that both the separatism charge and the punishment Tohti received – life in prison — is much more severe than what the majority of Han political dissidents have received. It’s a heavy-handed response.

As Maya Wang, a researcher from Human Rights Watch, told The New York Times, she could not recall any Han Chinese advocates or dissidents receiving a life sentence in recent years.

This is confirmed by leading academics on Xinjiang. Georgetown University Prof. James Millward mentioned in his timely op-ed in The New York Times that the sentence was longer than those given to other Chinese dissidents.

Tohti’s conviction in particular — that of a Uyghur scholar for a personal Beijing-based web forum he managed — indicates a shift in the (Chinese-run) Xinjiang government’s suppression pattern. It appears to be a new tactic for cracking down on Uyghur dissidents: going after their websites and accusing and in some cases convicting them, mostly falsely, of separatist activities.

Why the shift in framing and tactics?

The Xinjiang government had long attributed the source of violent protest in Xinjiang to Afghanistan, Syria, Chechnya, Pakistan, or other Muslim majority regions or countries, but so far not a single Uyghur attacker accused of recent attacks in Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi, Shache, and other places, has been found to have such alleged international connections.

So it’s not surprising that following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States, the Chinese and Xinjiang governments started blaming a homegrown terrorist group — the Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, ETIM) — for igniting unrest in Xinjiang.

Interestingly, the very existence of ETIM (and later TIP) is in question. The U.S removed ETIM from it’s terrorist organization watch list. This made China’s accusations that ETIM was the source of Xinjiang unrest difficult. In recent years, China shifted from blaming ETIM as an organization to claiming ETIM/TIP audio-video propaganda was motivating the unrest.

To say that Uyghurs were incited to violent attacks based on this propaganda, is a weak connection at best. Without considering that the government’s exclusionary policies toward Uyghurs might be at least partially to blame (extensively detailed in ISLAMiCommentary and by many Western journalists), the Xinjiang government now seems focused on cracking down on so-called “separatist” Uyghur web forums that they see as advocating separatism, terrorism, and extremism.

The Xinjiang government went to Beijing and arrested Mr. Tohti in order to prove that there is a “mastermind” or “ideologue” behind the unrest in Xinjiang. The government even went so far as to accuse Mr. Tohti and his website contributors of the July 5th riot in Urumqi in 2009 that caused the death of hundreds of people. (The Xinjiang government had previously accused the World Uyghur Congress and its leader Rebiya Kadeer as being behind the July 5th riot. Perhaps that didn’t stick.)

While Mr. Tohti was sentenced primarily for his running of a reasonably moderate, though critical, web forum on the Uyghurs and Xinjiang, many prolific Han ultra-nationalist websites have openly advocated Han racism, Han chauvinism, Han militarism, and even Han separatism by spreading hate speech against non-Han peoples.

The site http://www.huanghanzu.com (literally, “Heavenly Han” people) presents the most radical cultural attacks and portrayals of non-Han peoples, including foreigners such as Jews, people of color, and Chinese minorities such as the Uyghurs and the Hui Muslims.

While Prof. Tohti has called for dialogue and cooperation between the Uyghurs and the Han, http://www.huanghanzu.com publicly discusses the extermination of “evil Jews” who have dominated the World (including in Hong Kong), elimination of “dirty Negros” in Guangzhou, the expulsion of Muslims from China, and the “cleansing” of Han traitors and Han women who have “dirtied” themselves by being easily accessible to foreigners, and the like.

The forum manager is “Da Han Wu Di” (literally, “Great Han without matching enemy” or simply “undefeatable Great Han”), and most articles or comments on this web site have supported hate crimes, racism, or anti-Semitism.

Compared to Mr. Tohti’s Uighurbiz.net, Huanghanzu.com not only supports racism, but also advocates Han separatism by spreading hatred against non-Han peoples. If Mr. Tohti is being punished primarily for his Uighurbiz site, why doesn’t the “Undefeatable Han” get jailed for his “Heavenly Han” website ?

One could argue that Beijing is not censoring that site because it believes in freedom of expression. But, as is evident in the case of Tohti and Uighurbiz.net, the government doesn’t advocate freedom of expression for all.

It is China’s suppression of Uighurbiz and it’s punishment of the site’s manager, together with it’s refusal to censor the Huanghan forum, that reflects a dangerous social and cultural tendency. Punishing non-Han intellectuals for their expression of dissatisfaction only enlivens Han nationalism and bolsters Han separatism and racism, which is not a good sign for China’s minority populations and the government’s stated commitment to their rights under China’s Constitution and Ethnic Regional Autonomous Law.

Haiyun Ma teaches in the history department at Frostburg State University in Maryland. His teaching and research interests are Chinese History, Islam and Muslims of China (including Xinjiang), China-Middle East relations, and China-Central Asian Relations. He is an expert on China-Middle East relations at the Middle East Institute, and a regular contributor to ISLAMiCommentary.

I-wei Jennifer Chang is a D.C.-based writer and researcher on China, with an MA in international relations from the University of Maryland. Her research interests include Sino-Gulf relations, U.S.-China relations, Chinese foreign and security policies, China’s oil security, ethnic conflict, and U.S. foreign policy. She has conducted fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai, interviewing numerous Chinese scholars, think-tank researchers, and former ambassadors.

Macao daily

http://www.macaodaily.com/html/2014-09/30/content_939287.htm

伊帕爾 · 艾爾肯 (新疆)
我要告訴更多人,真正的維吾爾族是什麼樣

今年五月,中華民族團結促進會舉辦“民族文化周”,作為中央民族大學的學生代表,我來澳參與兩岸各族青年交流活動。
我是來自美麗新疆維吾爾自治區的姑娘,由於雙親都是警察,把保衛人民安全的工作放在第一位,經常要在新疆不同地區交流和交換,所以我從小自己做飯和居住,但家庭從未停止給我最大的關愛和優秀的教育。

在這土地生活二十年來,南疆、北疆許多地方充滿着美輪美奐的變化:喀什老城區高台民居日落時,年邁老爺爺還在等着最後一位前來買饢的母親;吐曼河靜靜流淌,聽着這座老城的禮拜聲;伊犁河畔大草原上牧羊少年天真爛漫的笑容;和田城區維吾爾族姑娘穿着美麗的艾德萊斯裙出嫁,父母用淚水送別,姑娘哭花了妝容;世世代代居住在阿勒泰喀納斯旅遊景區裡的圖瓦人,維護着喀納斯河邊這片最後的純潔聖土;有歌者唱:“請允許我把你的故鄉也當作我的故鄉,請允許我把你的閨房、葡萄藤和月亮,也當作我的天堂。”

在北京上學時,由於長相特殊,濃眉大眼高鼻樑,又講着別人不懂的維語,很多時被當成是“老外”,漸漸習慣別人用英文和我打招呼,然而當外國人聽到我說着流利地道的漢語時都甚為驚訝。從心底裡說,我無法讓所有人打破對新疆的固有思想,因為在大多數人印象中維吾爾或是新疆人就是唱歌跳舞、戴小花帽和吃烤羊肉串,這是對新疆人良好而淺薄的印象,不好的更是數不勝數了。在來澳門活動的面試時,我告訴老師希望有一次機會,能告訴更多人,真正的維吾爾族是什麼樣,用自己的語言和舞蹈,讓更多人真正去了解我們。

五月裡,我穿着民族服裝走在澳門的街道上,我覺得澳門不是東方拉斯維加斯,澳門是一座有靈魂的城市、一個宜人的城市,小巷建築、博物館、美食、濃濃的人情味,這個繽紛的世界是購物天堂、文娛之城,這裡節慶連年,美食薈萃。我深深地愛上了“他”,愛上街邊濃蔭蔽日的大榕樹,愛上大三巴上精美的浮雕,愛上葡京大樓在夜裡的閃閃爍爍。這些讓我想起我的家鄉,想要讓更多人看到在“一國兩制”下的美麗澳門是怎麼樣發展和進步的。

因為參加民族文化周而來到澳門,這七天雖然短暫,但能與兩岸不同民族同胞交朋友、談理想、展現獨特的自己,從未因為民族的問題產生隔閡,年輕的心靈彼此碰撞,有共同的夢想並富有激情。尊重和理解讓我在故鄉以外的土地備受感動和溫暖,確是這個夏天最幸福的事情。活動期間,我用心底裡全部的愛去和幼稚園孩子們做遊戲、用眼神交流。我用全身心熱情去舞蹈,真誠地去跟每個人交流。我教澳門旅遊學院的好朋友說維吾爾語,把祖母最喜歡的維吾爾民歌在澳門小巷裡哼唱,它是我們家族隨着血脈傳承下來精神上的安慰與引領。在大漠和戈壁裡,刀郎人以蒼勁有力的旋律高唱麥西來普;熱愛生命、熱愛生活的百歲老人跳起歡快的舞蹈,是淳樸父輩們教會我做人的善良,是這片土地上維吾爾族人創造的民族精神文化和物質文化讓我深深着迷,給予我力量。

這幾天,身邊也有很多其他民族的朋友希望認真理解維吾爾族,就像認識、理解每一段旋律每一個音符,去聆聽喀什民間藝人那種高貴、孤獨、憂傷的音樂。他們把維吾爾族、哈薩克族的青年人當作最好的朋友。哪怕只有七天,離別時台灣妹妹抱着我流淚,新疆維吾爾族姑娘和台灣阿美族姑娘捨不得離別,約定此生一定還會再相見。
感謝中華民族團結促進會優秀的團隊盡心盡力為來自偏遠地區的少數民族朋友帶來溫暖和尊重,希望民族文化周越辦越好,只有這些真正的文化使者從偏遠地區走出去,才能讓更多人親身的和他們交流,才能有彼此間真正的理解,才不會有人把某個民族跟“恐怖”劃上等號,而是更多地願意去欣賞其傳統文化和善良淳樸的人民。我希望澳門的同學可以來到美麗的新疆,與維吾爾族、哈薩克族等各民族的青年交流,親眼目睹新疆的美景,嘗遍新疆的美食,聆聽新疆獨特的民族音樂,走進大草原感受遊牧民族的熱情和好客,親身感受到遠在祖國西部那片土地原來是如此的溫柔親切。

我們的國家──中國已巍然屹立東方,世人刮目相看,她用巨手撫摸裂痕,回望昨日之輝煌,也拾起痛苦的記憶碎片;歷史長河滾滾東流,那一顆赤心換來五星紅旗飄揚;澳門島上盛開的金蓮花, “一國兩制”譜寫希望之光。全新的時代等着我們去開創,把握和平橄欖枝,鑄劍為犁。當我離開澳門之時,我對澳門說:“請允許我把你也當作我的故鄉。請允許我把你的大三巴、媽閣廟和小巷榕樹,都記在我心上。”
伊帕爾 · 艾爾肯
(新疆)

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/opinion/chinas-fruitless-repression-of-the-uighurs.html?_r=0

Last week, a court in China’s far western Xinjiang region sentenced Ilham Tohti, a member of the Uighur minority, to life in prison for the crime of “inciting separatism.” The conviction of this moderate scholar elicited international condemnation; the sentence was an order of magnitude longer than those given to other Chinese dissidents. But, far from being a show of strength, the sentence is a sign of the confusion and desperation behind the government’s policies toward Uighurs.

That Mr. Tohti, an economics professor and a blogger, should become a celebrated political prisoner is a paradox, for he is in many ways a poster child for what the Communist Party hopes more Uighurs will become. Educated, and eloquent in Mandarin, he was a party member from a family closely engaged with the state (his male relatives include members of China’s military and state security organs). He is professional, entrepreneurial and middle class (his family assets amounted to around $130,000 before state confiscation). He is not outwardly religious (most Uighurs are Muslims, but vary in the degree and nature of their observance). He is distinctive mainly in his outspokenness.

Though the Chinese often think of Xinjiang as a remote frontier of deserts and mountains, populated with quaint folkloric natives, it is closely linked to the rest of China and to Central Asia by an expanding transportation infrastructure; the skyscrapers, neon glow, booming commerce and air pollution of Xinjiang’s cities resemble those elsewhere in China; and although, like rural areas throughout the country, Xinjiang’s villages remain poor, the emerging middle class in the cities is scarcely different from its counterparts in other urban centers. Rapid economic development has benefited Uighurs as well as Han Chinese (each group makes up just over 40 percent of the region’s population of 21 million).

Yet the authorities seem puzzled and frustrated that, despite these economic gains, Uighurs remain adamantly Uighur. Sporadic local disturbances are endemic throughout China, but in Xinjiang they are colored by ethno-national and religious sentiments. After a relatively quiet decade, from 1998 to 2007, stability has eroded alarmingly since 2008, with a big, bloody race riot in 2009, sporadic attacks on police stations and representatives of the state and, over the past year, violence perpetrated by Uighurs against random civilians in Urumqi, the regional capital, and in faraway Yunnan Province and Beijing. Xinjiang authorities have responded to violence with an intense crackdown, including house-to-house searches, and a campaign against traditional symbols of identity: veils, head scarves, beards, traditional hats, Ramadan fasting, prayer.

Combined with the recent razing of Uighur architecture in the ancient city of Kashgar and elimination of the Uighur-language educational track from Xinjiang’s schools and universities, these measures seem aimed at repressing Uighur culture. Moreover, the authorities have now doubled down on their post-9/11 tendency to interpret Uighur unrest through a single lens — foreign-inspired Islamic “terrorism” — even when the real causes are local and political.

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It is unclear if China’s leaders entirely believe their own propaganda — that all Uighur troubles derive from external sources and are unrelated to government policies — but local and regional authorities certainly benefit from it: Whereas common people elsewhere in China enjoy some de facto freedom to protest official and business malfeasance, Uighurs enjoy no such latitude. In the absence of a free press, Beijing has few sources of on-the-ground information in Xinjiang other than its own self-interested and self-protecting local officials, who can readily justify their mistakes and abuses in the name of fighting “separatism, extremism and terrorism.” No surprise, then, that it was the authorities in Xinjiang, not Beijing, who were most eager to prosecute Mr. Tohti, for he has been arguing that Chinese policies themselves, not simply cyber-radicalization, have been engendering Uighur resentment and violence.

Yet by condemning Mr. Tohti, Beijing has not only subjected itself yet again to international opprobrium, but has denied itself a critical Uighur viewpoint and an alternative approach to the deteriorating situation in Xinjiang. Before it was shut down, Mr. Tohti’s Uighurbiz website was a forum for Han and Uighur contributors to discuss Xinjiang issues, bridging the two communities; the need for more interethnic communication was a theme when the Communist Party issued revised Xinjiang policy guidelines last May.

Most important, Mr. Tohti pointed out that China’s own existing laws could protect minority cultures — if only they were observed. He did not call for a radical American-style democratization, but rather for the protection of indigenous institutions — support for non-Han cultural expression, job opportunities and truly “autonomous” government administration — that is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and a 1984 law.

This system of “ethnic autonomy” was indirectly derived from the pluralist (though not democratic) ideology of the Qing empire (1644-1911), which first brought Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia and Taiwan under Beijing’s rule as a “great family under Heaven.” Though superficially resembling the system of national republics undergirding the Soviet Union, the system developed by the People’s Republic of China differed in substantial ways and was adapted to Chinese conditions and outlooks. It functioned successfully in the 1950s, when Xinjiang was designated the “Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region,” and again in the early 1980s, and it remains popular with minority groups even though they have never been afforded real autonomy. Far from “inciting separatism,” Mr. Tohti was advocating a return to foundational promises dating to Mao’s era.

Management of diversity and pluralism is a pressing world issue, from Scotland to Ukraine to Ferguson, Mo. China has an opportunity to contribute its own fixes to the bugs in the nation-state model, but cannot do so by locking up its most creative and courageous thinkers.

上周,中国西部边陲新疆的一家法院,以“分裂国家”的罪名判处伊力哈木·土赫提(Ilham Tohti)无期徒刑。伊力哈木是维吾尔族人。对这位温和的学者判刑,引发了国际社会的谴责,他被判处的刑期也比其他中国异见人士长出一个数量级。然而这一判决显示的绝非力量,而是政府对维吾尔人的政策背后的混乱和慌张。

伊力哈木作为经济学教授和博客作者,成了一个广受赞许的政治犯,这本身就是一个矛盾。因为他在很多方面都十分符合共产党希望维吾尔人成为的样子。他受过教育,汉语流利,也是共产党员,与体制内人员有紧密的家庭关系(他的男性亲属中包括中国军队和国家安全机关的成员)。他有专业知识,有企业家精神,也是中产阶级(在被国家没收之前,他的家庭财产约合13万美元)。他并没有表现出多少宗教情绪(维吾尔人大多是穆斯林,但信仰的程度和性质各不相同)。他与众不同的地方在于他敢于发声。

尽管中国人通常认为新疆是一个遍布沙漠和山峦的遥远边疆,那里古朴有趣的居民能歌善舞,但是通过不断扩大的交通网络,它与中国其他地区以及中亚紧密地联系在一起;新疆城市里耸立的高楼、闪烁的霓虹、蓬勃的商业,甚至空气污染,都与其他中国城市颇为相似;尽管就像全国的农村地区一样,新疆的农村也仍然贫穷,但城市里崛起的中产阶级,与其他城市的中产阶级没有什么不同。飞速的经济发展让维吾尔族受益,也让汉族受益(在新疆的2100万人口当中,这两个族群所占的比例都是略高于40%)。

尽管经济上获益,但维吾尔人对自己身为维吾尔人的身份仍然坚定不移,这一点似乎令官方感到困惑和不满。不时出现的地方性骚乱事件在中国各地都是普遍的问题,但在新疆,这些事件却被赋予了民族和宗教情绪的色彩。在1998年至2007年经过相对平静的十年之后,自2008年以来局势的不稳定令人担忧,2009年更是发生了大规模的血腥民族骚乱,公安机关及国家权力的代表不时受到攻击。过去一年,有维吾尔人在乌鲁木齐、偏远的云南省,以及北京对平民采取了不加区分的暴力袭击。新疆官方对暴力采取的反应是加紧打压,包括挨家挨户地搜查,及采取行动限制身份认同的传统符号:蒙面服饰、头巾、胡须、传统的花帽、斋月的斋戒,以及礼拜。

再加上最近在喀什拆除维吾尔建筑、在新疆的学校和大学里取消维吾尔语授课的课程,这些举措的目的似乎是压制维吾尔文化。此外,官方还加强了9·11之后的一种倾向,以同一个视角解读维吾尔人的骚乱——外国势力煽动的伊斯兰“恐怖袭击”事件——即使真正的起因来源于当地,是政治性的。

中国官方的宣传是,所有涉及维吾尔族的麻烦,都源自外部势力,与政府的政策无关。并不清楚中国的领导人是否完全相信自己的宣传,但地方和自治区的政府肯定会从中受益:对于官员和商人的不端行为,中国其他地区的普通人实质上享有某些抗议的自由,但维吾尔人却没有这种空间。在缺乏新闻自由的情况下,北京要想得到新疆当地的信息,除了通过下面那些自利、自我保护的地方官员,极少有其他渠道。官员们以打击“分裂主义、极端主义和恐怖主义”为名,可以方便地为自己的行为辩护。所以,最迫切地想起诉伊力哈木的是新疆当局而不是北京,这并不令人惊讶。因为他一直主张,是中国的政策本身引发了维吾尔人的愤懑和暴力行为,而不仅仅是网上的激进鼓动。

然而,对伊力哈木的打压,不仅让北京再次受到了国际社会的谴责,也让自己失去了一个关键的维吾尔族视角,还失去了以另一种途径应对新疆不断恶化的局势的可能性。伊力哈木的“维吾尔在线”网站被关闭前,是一个让汉族和维吾尔族作者讨论新疆议题的论坛,为两个群体搭建了桥梁;而增进民族间的交往与交流,也是共产党今年5月调整新疆政策方针时的一个主题。

最重要的是,伊力哈木指出,中国现行的法律可以保护少数民族的文化——只要能够执行。他并没有呼吁激进的美式民主化,而是主张保护本民族的习俗:支持非汉族的文化表达、就业机遇和真正“自治”的政府,而这在中国宪法中,以及1984年的一部法律中都得到了保障。

这种“民族区域自治”的体制间接地来源于清代(1644年至1911年)多元主义(尽管并不民主)的意识形态。清代将新疆、西藏、蒙古和台湾纳入了北京“天下一家”的统治之下。尽管表面上与苏联体制之下的民族共和国很相似,但中华人民共和国制定的体制,与苏联体制有显著的差异,并且根据中国的条件和形式做了调整。在上世纪50年代,这套体制运行得很成功,那时新疆成为了“新疆维吾尔自治区”。在80年代初期,也相当成功,尽管从来没有向少数民族赋予真正的自治,但这一制度在少数民族当中仍然很受欢迎。伊力哈木远非“煽动颠覆”,他是在主张回归毛泽东时代的基本承诺。

治理多元的社会、推行多元主义是一个紧迫的全球性议题,从苏格兰、到乌克兰、再到密苏里州弗格森,都是如此。中国有机会为解决民族国家模式中的问题做出贡献,但是如果把最有创造力、最勇敢的思想者关起来,就无法做到这一点。

James A. Millward, a professor of history at Georgetown, is the author of “Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang” and “The Silk Road: A Very Short Introduction.”

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Challenging Uyghur Muslim Identity: More Enforcement, Worse Results

Publication: China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 17September 10, 2014 04:39 PM Age: 26 min
By: Haiyun Ma, I-wei Jennifer Chang

Uyghurs fasting while observing Ramadan. (Credit: Al Jazeera)
Following deadly attacks in Beijing, Kunming and Urumqi over the last year, the Xinjiang government has intensified its efforts to regulate Uyghur religious activities. The provincial government has once again reinforced its ban on Ramadan fasting for Uyghur civil servants and students in 2014, as it has frequently done since at least 2001. Xinjiang has been developing its own policies to discourage Uyghur religious activities and decrease their observance of Islam since 1994, with the promotion of Wang Lequan to provincial Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary. However, these policies have become increasingly counterproductive, as Uyghurs have reinforced their religious identity as a way of resistance, either peacefully or violently.

Ramadan Ban

During this year’s holy month of Ramadan in June and July, the fasting ban focused mainly on Uyghur elites, such as civil servants, Party members and students, as local government agencies, state-run companies and public schools required or encouraged Uyghurs to break their fast by eating during the day. At the beginning of the holy month, ethnic-religious and United Front officials in Hami (Qumul in Uyghur) held meetings on how to strengthen control over fasting during Ramadan (Hami Government, June 30). Leveraging their control over Uyghur Party cadres, local governments provided free meals for lunch, while cadres monitored them for compliance, namely, observing whether the Uyghurs ate their meals and thus broke their fast. Furthermore, these government institutions organized parties and celebrations offering food during the daylight hours throughout Ramadan. For example, the Tarim River Basin Management Bureau celebrated the anniversary of the founding of the CCP by holding a dinner party for its predominantly Uyghur employees on June 28, the first day of Ramadan this year (Tarim Basin Management Bureau, June 30). Similarly, the Pishan County (Guma nahiyisi in Uyghur) Industry and Commerce Bureau held “sincere conversation” meetings to prevent its Uyghur employees from fasting during Ramadan Xinjiang Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce, July 3). Additionally, Uyghur business owners were punished if they closed their shops or restaurants during the day, as is customary in many parts of the Muslim world during Ramadan.

Prior Crackdowns

Over the last 20 years, the Xinjiang provincial government has taken a leading role in regulating Chinese Uyghur citizens’ religious activities, especially under hard-line Party Secretary Wang Lequan. This year’s ban on fasting is a first, but rather is a continuation and intensification of long-standing efforts to regulate Islamic practices and identity among Uyghurs. Since the early 1990s, the Xinjiang provincial government has sought to dampen Uyghur observance of Islam by imposing various restrictions on religious activities. The Xinjiang government has instituted a series of laws, regulations and campaigns aimed at restricting Islamic practices and behaviors among Uyghurs, including the aforementioned bans on fasting during Ramadan.

The ascendance of hardliner Wang Lequan to power as Party Secretary in Xinjiang in 1994 was accompanied by targeted attacks against Uyghur Muslim identity, as the local government instituted a series of restrictive policies on religion, directly attacking Islam and focusing on Uyghurs working for the government. In 1991, Wang stated that the major task of his government was to “manage religion and guide it in being subordinate to…unification of the motherland, and the objective of national unity” (Outlook, June 25, 2001, no.26, pp.52-53). In a similar statement in 2002, Wang repeated this stance when he called on his government to “oppose illegal religious activities that use religion to harm the socialist motherland and the people’s interests” (Editorial, Xinjiang Daily, October 13, 2002). Local laws and regulations affecting religion enacted under Wang’s leadership include, but are not limited to: The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Religious Affairs Regulations (effective in 1994), which tightened control over religion; Document 7 (1996) that mandates state leadership over religion; Instructions (1998), which called for cadres to fight against non-governmental religious activities; and the Interim Provisions on Disciplinary Punishments for Party Members and Organs That Violate Political Disciplines in Fighting Separatism and Safeguarding Unity (2000), which directly targeted ethnic Uyghur members of the Chinese Communist Party preventing prayer, Ramadan fasting and religious studies. These measures were aimed at opposing Uyghur separatism and preventing a Central Asian-inspired independence movement following the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Xinjiang appears to have intensified its “anti-terror” campaign. Beijing labeled some Uyghur groups terrorists and justified further crackdowns on Uyghur activities as part of its counter-terrorism efforts. The September 11 attacks came shortly after the Chinese government unveiled its own campaign against the “three evils” of separatism, extremism and terrorism in April of that year. As China supported the U.S. War on Terror internationally, Xinjiang’s local policies towards Uyghurs became more aggressive and restrictive. According to Uyghur rights activists, Uyghur youths were prohibited from entering mosques, which are all state-controlled and administered. Uyghur villagers were also forbidden to pray outside of their village mosques. Local police forcefully removed veils from Uyghur women’s heads and forced Uyghur men to shave their long beards, which caused family and communal anger and conflicts with the local law enforcement offices. Uyghur families were routinely subjected to surprise break-in searches by the local police (“Sacred Rights Defiled, China’s Iron-Fisted Repression of Uyghur Religious Freedom,” The Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 2013, pp.29-72). Unofficial publications of Islamic texts were deemed “pornography” by the Xinjiang government and thus targeted for confiscation and elimination.

In response to increased fear of terrorism, the provincial government discouraged Islam in general and specifically attempted to differentiate local Uyghur religious practices from that of more conservative sects, which it defines as Arab or Wahhabi. The Xinjiang government has officially designated full-body garments for woman and long beards on men as symbols of Wahhabism and the Ghulja city government, among others, have initiated several anti-Wahhabi campaigns (Yining Government, December 15, 2011). In April 2013, the government of Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture launched a training program to teach cadres how to resist the penetration of Wahhabism into Uyghur society (Guancha News, April 21, 2013).

More recently, the Xinjiang government has instituted a unique suite of religious policies aimed at Uyghurs, in contrast to the softer approaches to religion in other provinces of China. In March 2012, Uyghur civil servants and retired teachers were forced to sign agreements that they would not practice Islam (Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2012). More recently, the Xinjiang government issued a special identification card in Xinjiang to control domestic travel.

Further, Xinjiang officials appear to have taken a leading role in the development of policies towards Muslims minorities, especially under the rule of Wang Lequan from 1990s to 2010. These provincial leaders have not only made more efforts to control and confront Islam than China’s national government, but have exported these provocative policies to Muslim-populated neighboring provinces. In November 2009, the Xinjiang government announced a campaign targeting un-official and un-censored Islamic publications, called the “Tianshan Project,” spanning China’s entire northwest region including Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and Shaanxi (Xinhua, November 21, 2009).

Counter-Productive Results

Since the Xinjiang government has targeted Uyghur religious activities, Uyghurs unhappy with government restrictions on religion are likely to unify behind their Islamic identity, which serves as a political symbol of anti-Chinese resistance. As recent violent attacks indicate, the repressive religious policies have led Uyghur attackers to aggressively assert their Islamic religion by using religious symbols in their recent attacks, likely in the hopes of mobilizing their fellows Uyghurs to resist Xinjiang’s repressive religious policies. According to Chinese media, perpetrators of major attacks at Tiananmen Square and the Kunming railway station carried Shahada-bearing flags, a symbol of Islamic faith not previously seen during violent incidents involving Uyghurs. Xinjiang’s repressive policies towards Uyghur religion have produced counter-productive results for the government by contributing to the political and social alienation of elite Ughurs, religious revitalization among secular Uyghurs, and even radicalization of some Uyghurs.

These events appear to reflect a growing trend of Uyghur resistance that is likely exacerbated by current Xinjiang local provincial policies. More importantly, since Uyghur cadres bear the brunt of the religious regulations, they are forced to choose between their religious identity as Muslims and their occupation as CCP officials. This complicates their role as a bridge between the atheist CCP and the larger Uyghur population. The restrictions on religious expression among Uyghur elites have pushed them far from the state and closer to their own group, which will likely further polarize Xinjiang societal relations between the Uyghurs and the Han.

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张海洋七答新疆:学习锡伯族好榜样

2014年5月13日,由凤凰网自由谈沙龙发起,中国人民大学人类学研究所主办的“民族问题的问题”研讨会成功举办,此次会议旨在试图探索理解和解决民族问题的新思维。本文是凤凰网大学问栏目整理张海洋的发言,感谢主办方授权发表。

时间:2014年5月13日

发言人: 张海洋中央民族大学教授,博士生导师,中央民族大学中国少数民族研究中心主任

凤凰网:新疆传统社会是否存在现代化的困惑?

张海洋:这个困惑到处都会有,不必讨论。关键是我们面对这个困惑,在解决方式上不能太霸道,不要不懂装懂,不舒服装舒服,具体讲就是让各民族能做些自主选择。过去洋人压汉人搞现代化,用坚船利炮赶我们“进天堂”,我们不舒服,现在我们用民生加维稳的“胡萝卜”和“大棒”逼迫别人过好日子也是不对。

凤凰网:维吾尔族的民族文化认同困难,寻找土耳其语、伊斯兰教的动因?

张海洋:我认为人首先是文化动物,其次是地域动物,然后才是国家动物。中国长城以北和红军长征线以西的边疆边区,历史上和现实中都有丰富文化,汉语在其中本来不占什么优势,特别是在艺术、哲学和宗教方面。比如甘肃敦煌还不算很深的边疆,语言文字就已经很多。维吾尔所属的“突厥语族”根源本来是在中国。它吸收的波斯文化和伊斯兰教,现在也是中国的优秀民族文化。维吾尔族人口上千万,在中亚就是一个国家的规模。只是在人口更多的中国,它才成了一个少数民族。

历史上,维吾尔人在整个突厥世界里面,跟土耳其是东西两座“双峰”。维吾尔在文化方面有比土耳其高的地方,没有比它低的地方。在伊斯兰世界里,它跟波斯即现在的伊朗也是东西两座“双峰”,喀什在信仰伊斯兰教、生产伊斯兰教经典文献和诗歌、词典的创作方面,比西面也是不低。在中亚地区,更应该说是首屈一指的。

有些人认为维吾尔人不学汉语就没有出路,事实上周边用突厥语的巴基斯坦和土耳其(编者注:巴基斯坦可自产核武,土耳其为北约共有核武器国家,是否可独立制造核武器尚存疑),都能做出原子弹。你现在说非得用汉语才是先进,这对它就是睁着眼撒谎。你让他怎么服你?

还有历史,中国的历史本来就很丰富,但用汉人王朝的历史,你就只能说明东面沿海这一块地方。西部边疆地方,你就是要多用满、蒙、维、藏的语言文字才能说得更全面。现在主流社会不鼓励各民族自己编写历史,怕他们把族源的根子追到国境外面去。这是“南京南库” (编者注:张海洋讲南京国民政府的思想源流简称为“南库”,与北京北洋政府的思想源流“北库”相对)“小中华”的思路。其实你换用唐、元、清的思路,再用上“新丝绸之路”的思路,少数民族的历史文化追得再远,也不过就是我们正要拓展的“欧亚新丝路”包括“西南丝路”和“草原丝路”和“海上丝路”的范围。这些都是中国各民族祖先去过,子孙后代还要去去的地方。这有什么不好?你非要把大家的脑袋都锁定在中原和东南沿海又有什么好呢?

凤凰网:新疆政治治理对于近20年民族问题起的作用是什么?

张海洋:这个要回答确实有难度,能说得很复杂,也能很简单。复杂是因为民族领域的事情跟整个国家的内政外交密不可分,因而要由国安委来管才能管好;简单是说,它只不过是个观念或信任问题,只要观念能改,事情就能迎刃而解。

从复杂处说起:这个领域事情变坏的起点是上世纪1987-1990那三年。此后世界有过两件大事,世界是苏联解体和美国高调反恐,中国都跟着搭车吃错药。中共十四至十七届代表大会报告里讲民族的事儿,往前比不上十三大报告,往后比不上十八大报告。荣剑说今后10年的中国改革就是接续1980年代,这个观念是非常的深刻和到位。如果再深刻,就要说拨乱反正回归中国共产党的民族政策了。这就是问题的根源。

1911年辛亥革命至今百年,我看出一个“三十年周期律”,那就是头五年相对好,后25年就慢慢地变坏。最后十年一定是最坏,然后就要拨乱反正,顺应国情来个格式化。1949-1954年是中国共产党对国民党倒行逆施的格式化;1979-1984年是新中国对反右、大跃进和文化大革命的格式化。照这个规律,2009-2014年就应该对回归“南京南库”的民族政策和唯GDP主义做格式化。

现在该做的事儿没展开,但也为期不远了。我们前面讲拨乱反正、清算“两个凡是”就是这个意思。中国为什么非要靠这套办法纠正错误,我想这是体制机制或结构使然。用邓小平的话说,社会主义的好处就是能集中精力办大事。平时有小事儿不肯纠正,非要攒成一堆儿,弄得国家过不下去了,才来调整路线清算,跟大扫除一样,非要把那些颠覆国家、侵犯人权的东西清除一次才能把人心收拾回来。

凤凰网:1990年代以来新疆民族问题是严重还是在正常发展了?

张海洋:我觉得少数民族那面很正常,是我们的政策扭曲得太厉害了,愿意“因其疑似构成事端”的人太多了,连民族区域自治都快变成敏感词了。

我知道有人会说,这是境外敌对势力搞我们比以前厉害。这个构不成理由。你是独立国家,境外势力搞你是个常态常量。中国军事亚洲第一,经济世界第二,坐着联合国安全理事会常务理事国的交椅,世界上哪有这么强大的国家天天喊着被人搞的?难道毛泽东那个时候境外敌对势力比现在小吗?问题是你今天为什么就让人搞了,为什么就不能出去搞搞别人?中国维吾尔族这么大,你一个年轻人发一本护照,再放个五万块钱贷款,看他能把中亚搞成什么样?问题是你非要把人圈起来,把护照收回来,在高压锅里搞对口支援和维稳,这才弄得官不聊生、民不堪命。这个在唱“谁最苦谁最累”之前,还真是要想想你是谁为了谁。我觉得好好按照民族区域自治制度搞个“维稳的联产承包责任制”会省事儿些。开国先贤们的脑袋比我们大很多,账也算得清楚很多。

凤凰网:是否是民族区域自治制度造就了一个维吾尔族?

张海洋:这个判断也是无厘头。中国很多学者愿意解构维吾尔族,说国家构建了它,否则它就是沙漠绿洲里的松散人群。这都是些没用的话。难道中国的汉族不是构建出来的?汉族难道会比维吾尔族更同质化更结实?维吾尔族至少在语言宗教的同质性要比汉族高出很多吧?至于民族区域自治,那是国家宪政制度,正经学问人应该考虑循名责实,好好按照建国《共同纲领》、国家《宪法》、《民族区域自治法》和十八大政治报告政治决议坚持和完善。面对这么多法律文件还天天讨论一项基本政治制度的存废,这正是需要国安委出来维稳的“种族革命家心态”。

凤凰网:“两少一宽”和其他优惠政策的效果如何,如何评价?

张海洋:其实这些天网上发了好几篇文章讨论这些内容。这是毛泽东、邓小平的主张,胡耀邦也是萧规曹随,总之是共产党的正确政策,包括干部、教育等方面的优惠政策也都无可厚非。

你要在多民族统一国家里实行单一法律,甚至教学语言都很单一,那你不实行两少一宽和其他优惠政策让少数民族怎么办?我知道很多有“江南心态”、“新加坡情绪”和“新疆汉人心态”的人对此不满。但反过来想,如果这个国家的高考和公务员考试用的都是维吾尔语,藏语、蒙古语,再加上些严打高压措施,然后给你每个汉人补贴300分儿,法院对你也实行两少一宽,你乐意吗?现在你不承认他的习惯法,那就得有这些“正向行动(编者注:在正常情况下,现发生行为,沿正确道德舆论与法律法规及按行为发展的进程去分析,预期能达到正确的行为结果的行为)”。

什么时候国家好好地兑现了民族区域自治,国民教育好好兑现人民币上印的那些语言文字,就业市场好好落实少数民族比例,那这些政策也可以慢慢退场。在此之前,我看不出有更好的办法。

实践操作中需要这些折中,否则国家就维持不了团结和统一了。顺便问一句,大家谁能记得就是在这样“两少一宽”和“优惠政策”的背景下,马戎教师分析“六普”期间的新疆少数民族干部、农业人口和就业人口比例?又有谁敢说现在监狱里维吾尔族人口比例比汉人低了多少呢?那你喊了半天“两少一宽”和优惠政策是不是无的放矢?再说你看当今中国,两少一宽、正向行动affirmative action和民族区域自治,它是不是一个方向,是不是可欲的东西?你自己是不是也缺这个东西?如果是这样,那就先帮助别人实现这些享受,然后你自己也能跟着享受。但现在中国汉人,特别是读书人,脑袋好像进水不少,只知道“不明觉厉”而不肯“见贤思齐”,不是想法儿把自己提升到好的境界上去,而是要把好的拉下来,让它沉沦到自己的境界里。

以前我说学界里面是“犬儒”太多。现在看,大家做犬儒还不过瘾,还非要做到“鹰犬儒”。他闻见说的话不对它的味儿,例如说你讲了目前的民族区域自治还是半张政治白条、一座烂尾楼,因而还需要按照政策法规坚持和完善。他就赶紧给领导打报告,说这不够“喜大普奔”。领导也不肯调查研究,只是喜欢批条子发文件让人研究。

其实我只是说,今后中国在民族区域自治这个问题上面,继续“打白条不兑现”就是封闭僵化的老路,再要“撕白条不认账”,那就是改旗易帜的邪路。只有按照建国《共同纲领》,国家《宪法》,《民族区域自治法》,原原本本地坚持和完善这个制度,那才是中国特色正路。

但鹰犬儒就是把断章取义当学问。民族事务治理领域在实践上因而很难改进。我先前也爱往新疆跑。但2008年以后,就懒得去了,见不得路上到处设卡,查验身份证,弄得跟“非典隔离”的时候一样。如果我生活在新疆,也会觉得很难过。大家遇到困难的时候,本来应该相互信任,相互解放,相互担保,但现在却是相互修防火墙。这个东西修多了,修来修去肯定也会把自己修进去。如果说“各民族平等是立国之本”,那它就伤害了这个“国本”。

现在人们喜欢说新疆从汉代就有军屯,这是历史经验。但从文化生态学上看这条历史经验,我看它也有一条规律:进去的时候是军屯,出来的时候就是当地民族了。从唐朝中后期到1884年清朝建省时的新疆人口民族比例,显示的就是这个理。那么军屯人都去哪儿啦?新疆的锡伯族是不错的榜样,就是好好学习当地语言文化和生态知识,最终变成地方人,让当地人感到你确实是有贡献、受欢迎、离不开。