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Cui Cac – Truong Hoa Minh

On April 18th and 19th, the People’s Army (Quân Đội Nhân Dân) online newspaper ran two articles entitled respectively “Seven die in non-terrorshooting incident in Quang Ninh” and “Border gate resumes normal operations after shootingincident”, in which it is reported that “Two Vietnamese border guards and five Chinese nationals were killed in a shooting incident at a border gate in the northern province of Quang Ninh on April 18”, “At noon, when procedures were being completed for handing them [illegal immigrants] over to Chinese authorities in line with regulations and international common practice, some of the Chinese men snatched a gun from an officer and started to fire, killing a Vietnamese border guard on the spot” and “A number of others, including four Vietnamese border guards, were also wounded.”

The first question should come to mind, how come such ordinary men could, though briefly, take control of the situation and killed one Vietnamese major and one second lieutenant while injuring four border guards, despite the fact that they were up against armed forces of Vietnamese military officers and police, who could easily outnumber them?

The articles continue, “The immigrants, including 10 men, four women and two children, were detained early on the day when they were trying to illegally penetrate deep into Vietnam through Bac Phong Sinh border gate in Hai Ha district.”

Here comes the second question: how well do border gates between China and Vietnam operate, since the vehicle that carried those Chinese immigrants could run through a checkpoint after it was ordered to stop for check-in procedures? Even worse, the vehicle was able to travel deep into the inland territory of Hai Ha district (22 km away from Bac Phong Sinh border gate). One wouldn’t want to imagine what could have transpired if the people on that vehicle had illegally entered into Vietnam for other purposes rather than simply immigrating.

According to Quang Ninh authorities and various newspapers, the shooting incident took place between 12pm and 3.15pm. As a customs officer at Bac Phong Sinh border gate recalls on Vietnam’s Agriculture (Nông Nghiệp Việt Nam) newspaper:

“Our police and SWAT team, together with China armed forces, have managed to corner and arrest them… Around 3.30 it was announced the incident had ended. When I walked outside, there were dead bodies and bloodstains all over the place, while Vietnamese and Chinese officers standing around with guns in their hands… My heart was still beating so fast.”

It leads to the next question. Wasn’t 3 hours too long a period for a coordinated team of armed men specifically trained for combat to regain control over a handful of ordinary people arming with just a rifle loaded with 5 bullets and no more? Additionally, the shooting took place on Vietnam’s territory; so it was unnecessary for China soldiers to cross border unless their Vietnamese counterparts had been inadequate to handle the situation.

It is therefore reasonable to question the solidity of current defense at our borders.

Before an answer is settled, let’s take a look at these photos.

A photo taken by Tien Phong (Tiền Phong) newspaper’s reporter Thanh Duy (Thành Duy) with a caption: “Vietnam border soldiers hand over perpetrators to Chinese authorities.” This photo, however, was later removed from all Vietnamese state-owned media.

(China soldiers in camouflage-pattern uniforms; Chinese characters visible on the filming officer’s helmet)

Vụ nổ súng ở Quảng Ninh

A China SWAT officer in short-sleeved shirt and camouflage-pattern amour (Chinese characters on his armour)

This photo testifies to the participation of China armed forces in the killing and capture of a group of “illegal immigrants” in Vietnam’s territory. Therein, Vietnam soldiers were picking up a dead Xinjiang man while a China counterpart was observing in a gun-holding position. Who had allowed China’s armed forces to enter Vietnam’s territory?

During handover, Chinese officers were armed with weapons as opposed to Vietnam soldiers, who were empty-handed.

These two Xinjiang men had evidently been alive when they were handcuffed. However, they were left bleeding to death by both Vietnam and China authorities.

On another note, the way the April 18th shooting incident concluded is very telling. It is without a doubt that through this case, China government is sending a clear warning to Xinjiang people who are drawing up plans for third-country asylum.

Meanwhile, Vietnamese authorities have come under fire for cooperating with their fraternal neighbor. Local rights groups and activists point out that the arrest and handover of runaway Uighurs on April 18th go against international norms in terms of protection of the rights of asylum seekers. Criticism also includes Bac Phong Sinh border gate officers’ unsympathetic attitude towards the arrested Uighurs, which more or less led to the fatal shooting, and subsequent maltreatment of these 16 asylum seekers, among whom there were 4 women and 2 children.

http://cuicac.blogspot.com/2014/04/china-armed-forces-enter-into-vietnam.html?spref=fb&m=1

vietnamvietnam-1vietnam-2

Rose Tang

The Chinese government has admitted the refugees involved in a deadly clash with Vietnamese border guards on Friday are from Xinjiang (East Turkestan) and did not mention anything about them grabbing guns from Vietnamese police. Vietnamese state media report five civilians and two Vietnamese officers were killed, four were injured, after the detainees snatched guns from Vietnamese police. The death toll from China is only one.

A document from the Fangchenggang city government dated April 18 says the gunfight happened around 1:10pm in the Vietnamese border gate of Ba Phong Sinh in Vienam’s Hải Hà City in Quang Ninh province bordering China’s Guangxi province.

“Local villagers say Vietnamese police were escorting a group of Xinjiang people (about 16 of them, including four women, two children) towards Bắc Phong Sinh. They went to the third floor of the Vietnamese border patrol office building to have a rest, ready to hand them over to China. Xinjiang people had a scuffle with Vietnamese police who then shot Xinjiang people. One Xinjiang person died. Others have dispersed. Three Vietnamese were injured.”

The one-page document, with the heading “Information of Political Tasks in Fangcheng District, Fangchenggang City” and issued by Chen Mansheng, was posted on weibo and circulated on Twitter. It states the Fangcheng district government deployed police immediately to the site in Vietnam to deal with the case. “Armed police, the military and Tansan Police Precinct all sent members to control the border gate of Lihuo.”

See below a photo of the document, the other two photos of the refugees are from Vietnamese media.

Vietnam’s state-owned newspaper Thahn Nien reports China alerted Vietnam of the border crossing Friday: “According to the Vietnamese Border guard, they were informed by Chinese colleagues at 5:30 a.m. this morning that a group of Chinese nationals was attempting to enter Vietnam illegally.”

http://www.thanhniennews.com/society/illegal-chinese-migrants-kill-vietnamese-policeman-in-shooting-attack-25480.html

VTV1 TV News phone interview with the head of Quang Ninh border about the refugees (Thanks Thien-Huong Carabella for sharing/translating): 2 were shot (dead), 3 jumped off the building and committed suicide, 4 injured. From Vietnam side: 2 were shot, among the injured (didn’t tell figure) there were 4 officers. Bac Phong Sinh border gate was closed until Saturday morning. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKBXr3dqL54

Meanwhile, on Friday night, Vietnamese authorities in Tra Co of the Quang Ninh province arrested 21 people who arrived by boat from China. Vietnamese media reported the group may be linked to the 16 people who crossed the border in Bắc Phong Sinh that morning. But there haven’t been any reports saying they’re from Xinjiang.

Rose Tang is a writer and artist based in New York. She covered China for 12 years as a journalist for major Western media organizations such as CNN and taught journalism at Princeton University. She was named Journalist of the Year by Society of Publishers in Asia. She survived Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 as a student protester.

尊敬的共识网余氓老师和同仁:

甲午仲春好!贵网去年邀约中国社科院郝时远、北大马戎和中央民族大学海哥讨论边疆民族领域治理创新。三方意见交集虽浅,也略能唤起学人关注边疆民族地区的社会责任和道义担当。今年春,贵网又能针对无良媒体煽动民族民粹,恶意诋毁同胞,片面报导边疆的不义之举,集中发文以正视听。匡正世道人心功德非小。勇哥作为新疆长大任教广东的华南汉人,仍挂念边疆民族命运并关注维吾尔族文人心绪,在此期间厚积薄发,推出文章多篇文章引领公众关注边疆文化生态家园、语言宗教习俗和文化多样性公平传承。他的论点虽然瑕瑜互见,但都是良知良能义举和体现国家民族团结和解正能量。唯3月17日这篇“专制要不得,民族自治也需慎行”信稿的主要论点,却令海哥不敢苟同。

中国走向共和百年以来,民族领域形成南北两个智库。南库过去20多年用“国族同化论”迷思误导国民做金陵春梦,导致学人多乡原而少狂狷,宜乎相濡以沫,不做箕豆相煎。但姚文体现出学界公知和新疆新汉人对于胡耀邦作为党和国家杰出领导人、对于民族区域自治作为“中国基本政治制度三”,对于边疆民族作为生态家园主人公的“集体无意识”。这构成了辛亥革命会党用“种族革命论”绑架汉人落下斯德哥尔摩症候群的样板,极有分析价值。海哥因而要略表野人献曝之心,不揣冒昧地撰文抗辩。如蒙勇哥和各方体察,则中国幸甚,海哥亦幸甚。顺颂
勇哥春祺共识网编安! 张海洋2014甲午3.21识于魏公村

要厉行宪政重启改革不要再给“两个凡是”买单
–论勇哥非议何爷雄文“胡耀邦与民族区域自治”之非

中央民族大学中国少数民族研究中心 张海洋

先说标题“专制要不得,民族自治也须慎行”的不妥之处:
一是中国边疆民族地区和民族宗教领域治理摊上紧迫大事儿。各方都寄希望于社会创新转型、政治改革重启、治理体系和治理能力现代化以求解套。勇哥此时想帮忙了事儿,拿出的却是个“啥都要不得,哪儿也去不成”的方案,就是说当前状况还能持久,各方还要在水深火热的塔西陀陷阱囚徒困境、维稳陷阱财政黑洞、资源诅咒公地悲剧里打坐苦熬,显得站着说话很不腰疼。

二是姚文要掀翻何爷雄文论点,特别是其中的“民族区域自治”主张,但亮出靶标却是个没根儿没影儿莫须有的“民族自治”,所用论据缺少上下文因果关联。面对耆宿如此率尔操觚,是责备贤者过为已甚,对不住何爷以88岁高龄命笔纪念胡耀邦逝世20年,奋力推动边疆民族地区和民族宗教创新治理的良苦用心。

三是姚文“反方”的关键词是朱瑞女士提炼的“自治”两字。但这“自治”写在新中国建国《共同纲领》、国家《宪法》,《民族区域自治法》、港澳《基本法》及村民自治法上,因而是严肃的宪政制度政治契约,不是公知能在“议场”之外妄议其存废或“行与不行”的开放选项。能指挥枪的中国共产党面对这个“自治”都要说坚持和完善及“不容置疑、不容动摇、不容削弱”。姚文要以慎行为名把这个“国家基本政治制度三”拦住不放甚至关进笼子,却能对“港澳基本法”放心放行。这种态度,较之日前凤凰卫视阮次山两会访谈港籍全国政协委员许智明,公然主张废除民族区域自治制度的立场“虽不中亦不远矣”。汉人公知传媒在港澳台放火与蒙新藏点灯问题上如此行事苟且偏心无度,还要无端诋毁胡耀邦对边疆民族“讲信修睦行宪政”的功德业绩,诚不知各位是如何理解天良诚信公平正义国家民族团结统一,又怎样面对边疆民族宗教善政善治需求。

四是“专制要不得,自治须慎行”的主张看似中庸稳健,实则自相矛盾且潜存着深刻的人权道德危机和国家安全风险。“自治”原是国家为了让弱者面对强者采用合法方式,抵制专制苛政、维护家园权益的起码屏障。在国家能把专制暴政关进宪政笼子之前,让少数民族给文化生态家园扎起围栏,在家园门口设置双向红绿灯,也是个次优选项。勇哥明知专制苛政猛于虎根,却又不让边疆百姓实行民族区域自治。那剩下的选项岂不就是“强制同化或分离独立”?下面再看姚文五个论点之非:

“首先”,何爷是1922年是从陕西临潼走来的前辈耆宿国家老翰林。他当过延安抗大教员,参加过东北解放,见证过新中国建立和改革开放拨乱反正,一生都在内政外交和国际政治的文献和事务堆里打拼。他1959年就写过“当前民族独立运动的几个问题”,曾以文才得到周恩来激赏,近年又荣获过中国社科院论文一等奖。他虽然谦称不懂民族问题,但识途老马阅历如此,焉能不知古今中国、汉人、各民族的来头来历和各种话语陷阱的危险?他仗义抨击大汉族主义“非我族类其心必异”的官场潜规则,针对的是南库工程师贪腐团队袭用孙中山蒋介石的“国族同化论”绑架国人的陈年老病元根,遵循的是中国古人“君子求诸己”和共产党人“自我批评”的道德风范,指望的是中国新型民族关系重建“折墙平沟解疙瘩”。姚文信手就把何爷这番苦心拧成麻花儿,改换成古今中国各民族“你有我有全都有”的大民族主义毛病,且坚持让少数民族率先反思自身的毛病。这就偏离了何爷焦点,颠倒了矛盾主次,让人想起清初摄政王多尔衮让清军按住扬州嘉定汉人脑袋剃头并反思大汉族主义弊端的不靠谱儿行状。汉人公知持此立场,边疆民族治理难题还怎么解扣儿?

“其次”,何爷是前半辈子见过延安整风,干过刀头上舔血的营生,接受马克思主义民族观洗礼也早的老共产党人。他纵然肯定“民族自决”原则,也是基于共产党的党性和“英特纳雄奈尔”的普世价值。这境界绝非南京国民政府民族政策粉丝所能“度量”或望其项背。勇哥也承认自决原则有维护弱者权益的正义性,却又把它看成现代国家禁忌,这是香山、奉化、扬州人的双重标准和南京政府思维。其实自治自主跟自决一样,都是自下而上的治理之道,为的都是让少数民族既能在生态家园当家作主,又能用主体尊严能动来维护法治国家领土主权。况且何爷的重心也没不放在这个跟共产主义一样可欲难求的理想原则,而在当年曾给中国带来团结统一,近年能保证中国经济成功,今后且能助推新一轮以公平正义为核心的政治改革重启,今后更能给中国带来长治久安和中华民族复兴崛起的“民族区域自治制度”的实施实践上。老人的话句句都基于党纲党章,符合国家政策法规,且有他亲眼见证胡耀邦坚持完善民族区域自治制度的成果成效为证。姚文也不是非要否定地方自决,结尾时甚至讲到不怕国家优雅文明解体,只是害怕从自决延伸出来的“自治”会带来族际相残,因而又讲了一大套关于新疆西藏既然属于中国“现代民族国家”,就得“慎行”民族区域自治的国家理由Raisons Nationales。他只是没说现代中国只要没有民族区域自治制度支撑,就会变成南京政府那种“想象的共同体”,内忧外患和人权人道就会接踵至。

今天新疆能属中国,乃是毛泽东用电报明文承认阿合买提江领导的“三区政权”是中国革命组成部分,真诚邀请他代表新疆共产党组团参加全国政协,共商包括民族区域自治在内的建国大计大业。阿合买提江在伊尔库次克蒙难,毛爷还要再请赛福鼎、包尔汉组团前来北京上天安门城楼见证开国大典。今天西藏能属中国,也是毛泽东深恨国民党的民族政策荒唐失败,导致外蒙古痛失不可挽回,乃于1950年1月从莫斯科发愤电令“中国人民解放军加紧进军西藏”,却又在金沙江边按住解放军胜兵,反而不惜周折请西藏地方政府代表团来北京谈判,艰难达成《十七点协议》,以此来证明西藏归属中国不是基于占领吞并,而是基于两情相愿地共戴新中国并承诺实行民族区域自治制度的合法程序。平措汪杰(平汪)老先生在此期间作为藏区共产党创始人、中共老党员和亲身把十八军“红汉人”带进西藏的藏人,在这场和谈中多次勉为其难化解危机,得到达赖喇嘛和李维汉先生赞誉和毛泽东签名手赠《实践论》。目前比何爷还年长一岁的平汪先生还在病危弥留等待中国改革重启,指望跟海内外藏汉及中华各民族人民再次见证民族平等团结、国家幸福平安的殊胜尊严。

“第三”,“将上述这两个方面结合起来就说明”:新中国要继承大清朝的属土属民,又要在现代世界体系里行使现代国家的单一主权以维护民权、人权和各民族生态家园,就必须在“城邦与联邦”之间执两用中,把“民族区域自治”确立为人大、政协之后的“基本政治制度三”。这是新中国跟边疆各地各民族达成的最佳最划算的政治选择和制度设计。各民族往圣先贤和有识之识基于互信互惠达成的这项制度和结下的恩义,实在比承袭的清朝余荫更值得国人珍重葆用。回看当年的南京政府,就是因为总想用国族同化民族,不肯在边疆实行民族区域自治,所以才会痛失外蒙并跑去台湾反思且要跟民进党艰难打拼。如此结局何堪效法?前事不忘后事之师。
中国共产党前有共产国际的民族政策引领,后有长征途中接触少数民族深刻理解国情,又在延安有了跟国民政府、日本侵略者、苏蒙联军及边疆民族互动的实践体认,所以才能借鉴古今中外经验教训,做出民族区域自治的设计,表明中国对西藏、新疆、蒙古的主权,靠的不仅是承袭大清朝余荫和“枪杆子里面出政权”,还有新中国的共和宪政承诺和民族区域自治制度保障的公平正义保障。姚文理解“自治”只是中央政府向地方民族单向放权,且说国家只要放权就会解体,民族只要自治就会分裂。姚文有了这个假设前提,就没再提及两类反例:一是偌大俄国偌小瑞士都实行比民族区域自治还厉害的联邦制,至今都活得挺好。加拿大联邦、西班牙王国用宪政和自治制度化解各种国内民族分离危机,至今也没散架。乌克兰、苏格兰的公投结果无论是分是合,一不死人二不强力维稳的前景也是秃子头上的虱子明摆着;二是国内的延安朝鲜族自治州和内蒙古自治区贯彻实施民族区域自治制度都比新疆和藏区更好更深入,现在也没见新疆藏区那样让勇哥担心的官不聊生、民不堪命状况。勇哥会说各地条件不同,但海哥也会说各地都是中国地,各民族都是中国人,都在解放军守护共产党领导之下,因而都至少适用“三个自信”之一。

勇哥理解自治是中央给地方单向放权。海哥觉得何爷理解的自治是中央跟地方民族双向放权:中央政府向民族区域下放治权事权,为的是让各地各民族能用制度围栏和双向红绿灯来节制中央部委权力一手遮天和横冲直撞;边疆民族地方的政权和头人领袖向中央上交“地方主权”,为的是让党和国家能基于党性和国家宪政,参照国际规范,运用国家机器、经济杠杆、人权准则和文化生态保护措施来深化边疆民族地区治理,确保个体公民的人权和各民族的文化生态和集体家园权,包括保护在少数民族地区奉公守法、尊重少数民族权益而不仗势欺人、以势压人意在搞乱边疆浑水摸鱼的汉人移民的权益。

“其四”,姚文替国家否定“自治”后,又替边疆“少小民族”担忧,无端地说何爷是基于“汉族/少数民族两元逻辑思考边疆民族”,没有考虑新疆“少小”民族权益,且不知自治主体民族会在自治地方“以大吃小”,所以才出言不慎主张民族区域自治。海哥认为这话要是少小民族所说就有些信度,但由新疆汉人公知说出来就要打些折扣。民族自治地方是国家下属的行政区域而不是独立王国,除了党的领导和军队守护,还有各民族互相监督。况且边疆人对“民族”的理解也跟内地汉人不太一样:如果情况正常而没有大汉族主义作祟,他们对人的判断首先不是“民族”,而是会不会讲当地话、是否懂宗教知识、会不会写诗,能不能用民谚,举止是否优雅得体,最重要的是言行一致,不是嘴上说为了人家好,却把人家的资源和权力垄断在自家手里。

说起以在吃小,海哥记得新疆解放起义的包尔汉老人就是个“少小民族”塔塔尔人,他在新旧中国的新疆都是“高干”且深得维吾尔族人信任。1954年新疆克兹勒苏柯尔克孜族自治州成立,要找一块好绿洲作为州府驻地。维吾尔族也能把喀什附近的阿什图拿出来成人之美。可见民族间的以大吃小,多半是近年汉人公知师心自用。海哥也承认各民族做事儿都难免上行下效:汉人在前面有“五族共和”约法,后面有“统一的多民族的社会主义国家”定义的大中国里带头儿否认民族区域自治制度,那就跟在股份制合资公司里带头示范“大股吃小股”一样,有“劣币驱逐良币”效应,因而对“少小民族”造成的伤害最大。再说“民族区域自治制度”虽然要从全国人大往下颁布,但操作上还要跟“村民基层自治”配套,机制还是要“自下而上”。例如何爷讲的“自治”虽然以自治区一级的《民族区域自治法实施条例》出台为目标,但也要以基层社区和文化生态家园作为起点。换成政策法规:“自治单位”要先建设行政村、民族乡、自治县、自治州才能达到面向中央和全国的“五大自治区”层次。事实上,1955年建立的新疆维吾尔自治区内部,就有一半以上的地方是1954年先行建立的蒙古、哈萨克、回、柯尔克兹、锡伯等民族的自治地方。其中巴音郭勒蒙古族自治州的面积就多达48万平方公里,相当于江苏、浙江、江西和福建四省,占新疆自治区1/4强。还有北疆1954年成立的伊犁哈萨克自治州面积35万平方公里,且是全国唯一的“副省级”地位。仅这两个州的面积就已超过新疆幅员一半。由此可见所谓的“民族区域自治会导致以大吃小”,也是汉人总要让权力“吃独食”的文化思维定势,全不是何爷讲的那种“双向授权制衡”的宪政设计。姚文还自设一个困境:先说“国家暴政”能保护少小民族,压制自治区主体大民族恃强凌弱;又说国家政治好坏都跟汉人百姓无关。海哥对此有如下抗辩:
一是善政善治跟苛政暴政有别。“苛政猛于虎”的四人帮暴政,或许偶尔能做点儿劫富济贫扶弱抑强的正事儿,但多半都会大小通吃,使得各民族“覆巢之下无完卵”,否则边疆局势也不会糜烂,各民族在2009年7月上旬也不会那么红眼。

二是假设书记的民族背景是个无所谓的中性条件,但只要“国家”在边疆民族地区不用当地民族语言文字、对伊斯兰教和藏传佛教不肯信任尊重,汉人百姓就容易在教育、就业、招工、招干甚至圈占资源方面占先。同理,只要汉人在边疆民族地区不肯学民族语言文字、不肯遵守民族宗教禁忌风俗习惯,不肯用当地人认可的公平方式分享水源,就容易用借口要党和国家政府“慎行”民族区域自治制度,从而会给边疆少数民族权益造成不亚于国家暴政的伤害。

“其五”,姚文千里来龙在此结穴:做出了“一错一偏一正”三个结论:“一错”是把新中国边疆民族地区和民族宗教领域65年形成的当前状况和治理不当的责任一股脑儿地推到在位不到7年且只是“大秘书一个”的胡耀邦头上,轻松跳过1952年习仲勋代表西北局制止新疆局极左的经历和后者后来的反攻倒算;跳过了四人帮十多年的倒行逆施;跳过了南库近25年裹挟着边疆民族宗教领域向南京“昏鸦三匝迷枯树,回雁兼程溯旧踪”的恶果。勇哥把当前边疆困局简单归因到胡耀邦那次有心无力且半途而废的拨乱反正行动上,就忽略了所有的“逆转事件”都发生最近25年的两大背景之下:一是世界后现代转型提速、苏东剧变、美国反恐卷入“文明冲突”继而推动颜色革命;二是中国南库民族主义回潮、国家民族宗教政策转向、民族宗教部门边缘化、西部大开发不受民族区域自治制度节制和新疆贸然跳上美国反恐战车引狼入室。照勇哥的逻辑,当前中国重启改革开创新书面既不必粉碎四人帮,也不用清算“两个凡是”,也不要解放思想拨乱反正,也无须落实党的民族政策,只要像英明领袖华主席那样闷头儿任劳任怨纯朴厚道地给当年的新疆局、文革的四人帮、近20年的南库误导和虎根贪腐集团乱政的后果买单,边疆困局就能消炎消肿,国家就能在2021年实现十八大“建成五位一体全面小康社会的目标”。但当肖边疆民族宗教治理状况之危重,经济前景之波谲云诡、国际形势之复杂多变,还有“反腐跟危机赛跑”之千钧一发,哪里还能允许这代人这样做事儿。况且30年前的形势也没能容得华主席把单买完,就被明眼人划清政策界限开创新局。直白讲:假如今年纪念《民族区域自治法》颁布30年、新疆工作会议和中央民族工作会议还不能“粉碎四人帮清算两个凡是解放思想拨乱反正”,那国人明后年再想唱“时间都去哪儿啦”时,就要换成赵紫阳问的“权力都去哪儿啦”?

姚文的“一偏”是:它虽不认可“民族自治”但还认可印度联邦那样的“区域自治”。海哥对此要说:当今中国的“民族区域自治”本来也不是“民族自治”。新中国开国先贤当年做这个制度设计时,土耳其建国和印巴分治那些惨酷绝伦的民族清洗和人权人道危机都已发生。毛泽东那代人对此不会视而不见。因此,从民族区域自治从本质上讲,就是在承认少数民族权力权益的前提之下的地方自治,因而也就是中国内地依法实行地方自治的前锋前哨。如果边疆民族地区迈不出“自治”的脚步,即使把内地全变成直辖市,中国政治也还是会眼前一样颓唐。

姚文的“一正”是比很多国人,特别是比所有的媒体公知更清楚地认识并且说出了所谓“三股势力”的复杂根源:极端宗教势力的后面必有极端世俗化;民族分裂势力后面必有极端统一同化;民间暴力恐怖势力的后面必有违法滥用国家机器滥施国家暴力恐怖势力作怪。物有本末事有终始,知所先后则近道矣。中国受不了前面的三股势力,难道就能受得了后面三股势力的折腾?善政善治终归要以正确解读信息分析形势,顺乎人心人性和天下大势为前提。海哥对勇哥的这点高见绝对叹为观止。

回想胡锦涛叔在位10年形格势禁,提出和谐社会理念,旨在一面给南库在边疆民族地区和民族宗教领域折腾出来的亏空买单,一面展示“科学发展观”,结果越买就越没底线,直到2009年新疆突发7.5事件中断重大国际日程抽身回国,直到2012年重庆副市长王立军出走美国领事馆,结果让国家和个人经历两次重大形象危机并折断政治手臂,留下了壮志未酬的无穷遗憾。但他作为胡耀邦的学生和战友在2005年全国民族工作会议和民族团结进步表彰大会上对民族区域自治制度的认识和阐释还是极其到位:

“民族区域自治制度是我国的一项基本政治制度,是发展社会主义民主、建设社会主义政治文明的重要内容,是党团结带领各族人民建设中国特色社会主义、实现中华民族伟大复兴的重要保证。“在国家统一领导下实行民族区域自治,体现了国家尊重和保障少数民族自主管理本民族内部事务的权利,体现了民族平等、民族团结、各民族共同繁荣发展的原则,体现了民族因素与区域因素、政治因素与经济因素、历史因素与现实因素的统一。”“实践证明,这一制度符合我国国情和各族人民的根本利益,具有强大生命力。民族区域自治,作为党解决我国民族问题的一条基本经验不容置疑,作为我国的一项基本政治制度不容动摇,作为我国社会主义的一大政治优势不容削弱”。

涛叔在南库黑云压城的背景下,还能把民族区域自治话说到这个地步,也算对勇哥的问题做出了来自“正常渠道”的完整答复。检验政治优劣的标准从来是兑现宪政制度法律的能力。勇哥信稿的最大误区是放着大好时间和精力不去推动观念更新知识创新,却发花费移山心力为“不兑现”来辩护开脱,甚至想到了“政治白条儿兑现不了就撕”,“制度烂尾楼封不了顶就拆”的歪主意。这就冲撞了涛叔告别政坛时留下的宝贵政治基业:即用《十八大政治报告》接续起十三大政治改革路线上的民族工作正确叙事:“全面正确地贯彻落实党的民族政策,深入开展民族团结进步教育,坚持和完善民族区域自治制度,促进各民族和睦相处、和衷共济、和谐发展”。

中国有识之士恒言今天这轮改革是接续1980年代。民族领域今年更要努力接续起1984年颁布《民族区域自治法》的后续工作。世人恒言边疆民族宗教领域事情难办。其实海哥已经看出它难就难在过去20多年里,辛亥革命南库用南京民国知识的狸猫,换掉了中国共产党北库北京中国知识的太子,因而才需要拨乱反正重启改革回归正轨。忘记了过去就是背叛。背信弃义终归不祥。国族同化是痴人说梦。皇帝的新衣维稳也难。依法行宪是天经地义。讲信修睦是人间正道。能诚信则反侧自消。不自治便宽严皆误。50后国人勉力哉。 海洋2014-3-24初稿

專論/專論/少數民族和國家關係之思考:民族認同和政治身份如何統一/馬海雲撰文/馬海雲撰文

http://www.cdnews.com.tw 2014-03-03 19:50:59

 這周發生在雲南昆明的暴力恐怖行為震撼了所有善良的人們,一夥歹徒殘忍地殺害了與其素不相識、毫無瓜葛的路人。隨著新聞報導的逐步深入,這一兇殺案件的面目初步顯山露水。儘管官方明智地避免提及肇事者的民族屬性,但嫌犯的身體、語言以及其他特徵和證據交織指向了維吾爾族。這一指向和之前發生的幾次暴力事件其實共同描繪出了近20年來新疆維吾爾族和中國政府的關係走向。

 對於這些暴力行為,網路、微博以及媒體仁者見仁、智者見智地發表了不同見解。其中在中國大陸不乏情緒性地宣洩,也不乏宣傳性的總結;而在國外,對這些暴力的根源更多地同中國的少數民族政策和人權事務聯繫起來。這些不同的觀點和視角其實正反映瞭解讀這些現象的複雜性和多樣性。本文無意就具體的案件進行刑偵式的具體分析或意識形態化的說解,而是通過回顧中國近代穆斯林和國家的關係模式,來分析當代所謂“民族”範式和“民族政策”在處理新疆穆斯林公民和國家主體之間的問題。

 如果我們從清代開始看待中國有效管轄新疆的歷史,那麼清史專家很自然地聯想到一個詞:“回部”。乍一看,這一術語似乎是個偏正名詞,來指代“回人的部落”。但通過研究清代治理新疆的模式就可以得出,其實,在清代的國家政治中,“回-部”是一個聯合名詞。它實際上是指對清代版圖內的回疆穆斯林的治理模式。簡單地說,“回”是指同穆斯林有關的事務,尤其是宗教、民族、風俗、法律等;“部”是指清朝維護新疆統治的一種間接管理模式,即如同對“准部”“番部”一樣,清朝採取的是一種以駐軍為威懾的地方自治模式。因為清朝的多元民族屬性,學者們更傾向於注重對清代“回部”之“回”的族群性和宗教性的研究,而或多或少忽略了對“部”的政治內涵的研究。其實這一聯合片語所表達的資訊是:國家以“部”之管理模式經營新疆穆斯林,同時又以當地穆斯林的民族和宗教屬性而因地制宜地自治。這樣,我們就可以理解,為什麼清代的回疆穆斯林可以沿用當地的文化、宗教、甚至法律來治理。這種關係模式實質上是在地方自治和國家主權之間形成了一種平衡:即維吾爾人的民族宗教文化得到了充分的維護和實踐,而國家又有效地實施了主權和管轄。

 國家和維吾爾人的這一“回-部”關係模式在民國轉變成“回-民”模式。孫中山的民族主義運動和“五族共和”(漢,滿蒙,回,藏)的思想和實踐將中華民國和維吾爾穆斯林(也包括現在的回族穆斯林)之關係定義為“回-民”:一方面,維吾爾穆斯林(和內地回族穆斯林)的民族宗教文化屬性“回”得以延續和尊重,另一方面,清代的“部”政轉變成“民”政,即在新的政治架構下,維吾爾人和其他族群一樣,都是中華民國的公民。

 這樣,我們不難看出,中華民國和維吾爾穆斯林的關係模式的根基沒變,即維吾爾穆斯林的“回”性和中華民國公民的“民”性在這個新的聯合片語中也達到了另外一個平衡和穩定。

 而在新中國的民族模式下,包括維吾爾族在內的少數民族和國家主體的關係出現失衡。在一個統一的多民族國家中,儘管民族模式、民族識別以及民族政策充分體現了國家對少數族群民族文化身份的承認,但是卻沒有清晰定義國家賦予少數民族成員的政治身份和地位。以“維吾爾族”為例,在這個新的指帶中,我們只看到了“維吾爾”的民族和文化意涵,但卻沒有看到它在中國政治生活中的地位和權力。也就是說,在民族模式建構的國家和維吾爾族的關係中,我們沒有看到清代的“部”,也沒有看到民國的“民”。即使是高度政治化、制度化的民族區域自治的實踐,充其量也就是對少數民族民族屬性的一種地方性展示;在國家層面來講,缺乏一個清晰定義各族人民政治身份的概念。這種缺失一方面使得少數民族在中國的存在更多地是以單個的“族”為單元,而不是同清代的“回-部”或民國的“回-民”這樣一種既兼顧其民族文化屬性又涵蓋國家政治身份的聯合體。這種單一“族”體的存在和強化(常常被認為是“民族主義”),對於國家來說,顯然成了一種心腹之患。所謂的增強國家觀念的種種運動也就從弱化或消除“族”性開始。而從少數民族的角度來看,其“族”性的伸張不但沒有獲得應得的政治和法律地位,而且卻因為伸張而遭受更重打壓。所以在有關誰是“中國人”這個問題上,儘管缺省的選項是中國境內所有的少數民族和多數民族都是“中國人,”但民族模式下的“漢族”或“維吾爾族”都沒有呈現出它們的政治身份。

 在思考中國的民族問題和民族和國家的關係時,很顯然“民族政策”(無論是好是壞)只是有關“族”的一部分,而另一有關國家政治身份的部分至今還是個空缺。北京大學的馬融教授顯然看到了這一缺陷和缺失。他積極宣導的少數民族的“公民”身份和個體權利顯然有所指。但是,我們必須要強調,少數民族成員平等政治身份和權力的獲得並不意味著他們要以放棄自己的集體性的民族文化宗教傳統為代價。正如中央民族大學的張海陽教授所呼籲的那樣,少數民族的族群性是不能也無法磨滅的。清代的“回-部”和民國的“回-民”的關係模式其實已經提供了如何將少數民族的民族文化屬性和國家賦予的政治身份有機結合的歷史先例。如是,那麼當前中國有關少數民族問題、尤其是新疆問題的本質不是“民族政策”和“民族關係”,而是如何重建有機整合的“族-民”模式,它既可以尊重少數民族的民族文化宗教,又可以體現國家的政治身份和國家認同。

         (作者馬海雲為美國馬里蘭霜堡大學歷史系教授,研究中國穆斯林民族和伊斯蘭文化。)

【中央網路報】

http://www.centnews.com/Politics/China-sees-happy-minorities-and-terrorists-in-Xinjiang/S-2014-03-13/44765.html

China sees happy minorities and terrorists in Xinjiang
Posted at :2014-03-13 04:34:41
Posted by : Kelly OLSEN

China – Chinese portrayals of the far western region of Xinjiang veer from a happy land of dancing minorities to a hotbed of dangerous separatist terrorism, polarised and simplistic viewpoints that experts say are used to justify domination and harsh security.

The vast area has drawn international attention for its spasms of violence, which officials decry as “terrorism” by “Xinjiang separatist forces” — code for radicalised Uighurs, the region’s largest ethnic group, who are mostly Muslim.

Beijing blamed such separatists for a horrific machete attack at a railway station earlier this month, when 29 passers-by were killed and 143 injured.

But, at the same time, state media and official propaganda paint a more idyllic picture of Xinjiang, stressing an ethnic tapestry of brightly-coloured national costumes and customs against a background of breathtaking natural beauty.

“Minority people here are good at singing and dancing,” according to “Xinjiang Cartoons”, an English-language book illustrated with drawings introducing the region’s history, culture, society and environment.

“They turn this part of the world into a happy and harmonious world.”

The publisher is China Intercontinental Press, an arm of the national government’s information department.

“Xinjiang is a sea of song and dance,” adds a brochure put out by the regional government.

Both publications were made available to journalists covering the National People’s Congress, China’s Communist Party-controlled legislature, which ended Thursday.

There is a long history of Chinese influence and periods of rule in Xinjiang, which has religious, linguistic and cultural ties to Central Asia.

But, as in Tibet, resentment has been stirred by an influx in recent decades of millions of ethnic Han, who account for 92 percent of China’s population.

Experts say Beijing’s romantic depictions of Xinjiang are a key element in a narrative of constructed simplicity used to cast the region in a patina of vulnerability and innocence.

“This is the typical Han orientalism towards Uighurs and other ethnic minorities,” said Haiyun Ma, an expert on Xinjiang at Frostburg State University in the US.

The objectification of peoples and nations, aimed at domination, was analysed in the landmark 1978 book “Orientalism” by Edward Said, who focused on European and US attitudes towards and relations with the Middle East.

In the book, Said wrote: “Orientalism can be discussed … as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority for the Orient.”

Ma said that such imposed exoticism helps telegraph to the Han that Xinjiang’s natives would be helpless without their tutelage.

“They are socially, culturally, politically backward, that’s why you need all these so-called laodage (big brother) Han Chinese to help them,” he told AFP.

Conversely, Chinese scholarship on Xinjiang has turned into an industry focused on anti-terror studies and projects dependent on state funding, Ma said.

“There is an ideological campaign against Xinjiang,” he said.

- ‘Three evil forces’ -

The idyllic image is in stark contrast to the very real violence that regularly hits Xinjiang.

Ethnic rioting in the regional capital Urumqi in 2009 left around 200 people dead and resulted in a security crackdown.

Numerous deadly clashes have been reported in Xinjiang since last April, and the railway station attack earlier this month in Kunming — 1,600 kilometres (1,000 miles) away in the southwestern province of Yunnan — raised fears violence was spreading beyond the region.

Authorities also blamed Xinjiang separatists with links to foreign extremist groups for a deadly vehicle crash in late October on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the symbolic heart of the Chinese state.

Xinjiang has borders with eight countries, five of them largely Muslim — Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.

But outside experts largely see the problem as one of Uighur frustration with state efforts to interfere with religious identity and expression — accusations China denies, stressing it “protects the rights of all ethnic groups, including their freedom of religious belief”.

Authorities are careful, however, to avoid blaming Uighurs as a whole for violence, suggesting rather that anyone involved has been duped by wicked outside elements intent on breaking up China.

Terrorism, they say, is one of the “three evil forces”, along with ethnic separatism and religious extremism, from which Uighurs must be protected.

“China’s state-controlled media portray Xinjiang’s Uighurs as vulnerable to — and therefore as potential victims of — hostile foreign Islamist influences,” said Nicholas Dynon, who researches Chinese media and propaganda at Macquarie University in Sydney.

On one hand, Beijing puts out “positive orientalist images of content ethnic minorities” and “negative images of separatist elements infected by foreign extremist contagion” on the other, he told AFP.

The narrative, he added, was constructed “in the interests of national unity”

http://islamicommentary.org/2014/03/muslims-we-can-do-business-with-china-welcomes-arab-trade-in-its-hui-muslim-heartland/

For three years running, the China-Arab Economic Forum held its annual gatherings in Yingchuan, the capital city of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in Northwest China — a region with the third smallest GDP in China.

The meetings, held in this “Muslim heartland,” attracted 18 national leaders, including Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, 195 ministerial officials, and 93 diplomats from 76 countries — and resulted in trade contracts worth about $42 billion (RMB 254 billion). Five thousand foreign and Chinese enterprises and 3,000 businesspeople from China and abroad participated in these forums held in 2010, 2011, and 2012.

Last Fall the forum, renamed the China-Arab States Expo, resulted in more than $42 billion (RMB 259 billion) in contracts— surpassing in one year the combined value of contracts signed at the previous three China-Arab forums.

The contracts, signed by a mix of private companies and state interests on both sides, were for agriculture, energy and new technology, cultural and educational tourism, halal food, and finance.

Organized by China’s Ministry of Commerce, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the transformation of this regional gathering to one of national relevance, significance and scale, indicates a joint effort to improve trade with Arab and Muslim countries aimed at “sustaining friendship, deepening cooperation, and joint development.”

The connection between international trade and diplomacy has a demonstrated history in China that dates back to the well-known ancient tribute system. In recent years, China has put a concentrated effort into strengthening relationships – both economic and political – with Arab and Muslim countries.

ChinaArabStatesExpoBannerThere were 22 Arab and 57 Muslim-majority countries targeted by organizers of the 2013 China-Arab States Expo. And many of them came; including representatives from Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and 67 other countries. The size of the Kuwaiti delegation was particularly noticeable in that it alone had an exhibition area of about 1000 square meters. Also of note, the expo wasn’t male-centered.

According to the latest statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce, Sino-Arab trade in the first 10 months of 2013 topped $194.9 billion. Although the expo’s precise contribution to overall Sino-Arab trade is unclear, the numbers (more than $42 billion) are strikingly significant given the small and resource-poor Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

While trade opportunities at the expo may have centered on Ningxia, representatives and business people from other Chinese regions also attended these gatherings for the chance to make Arab and local business contacts.

In addition to generating an increased volume of trade, these trade fairs have also become a potential platform for increased political consultation. China’s No. 3 national leader Yu Zhengsheng (the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), at the expo’s opening ceremony, called for an “increase in mutual political trust and strategic consultation.”

A Bloody History

From a historical perspective, the location for the economic expo is of major significance. Ningxia had been a battlefield between the Hui and Han peoples since the late 19th century up to 1970s. Ningxia Hui Muslims were slaughtered at Jahirriyya center of Jinjipu by ZuoZongtang’s forces in the 1870s. This historical, religious, and ethnic hatred was reinforced in 1960s during the Chinese Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.

Three decades after Chinese economic reform of its coastal regions in the ‘80s, China has now begun to see the “usefulness” of the interior Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and it’s Hui Muslim population (they constitute about 34%) that, geographically isolated, had been perceived as economically backward compared to the coastal regions.

With this new expo and other initiatives, China is using the Hui connection to reach out to Arab and Muslim states. And, this has benefited Ningxia Muslims who are now engaged in trade with Arab and Muslim countries on a regional, national, and international scale.

Keeping in mind the historically bloody relationship between Chinese Muslims and the Chinese state since the 19th century, this new kind of economic outreach facilitated by cultural and religious ties could mean closer relations and a new and deeper level of trust between Hui Muslims and the Chinese state. This is no small feat.

There exists both a pattern in China’s thinking about the culture and religion of its Muslim citizens, and a history of using its Muslims for political gain when necessary. During the Sino-Japanese wars in 1930s, China deployed Muslim intellectuals and diplomats to gain Arab and Islamic support for China’s resistance war. (Is history repeating itself? In recent years, relations between the Chinese state and Hui Muslims have gotten closer as Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated.)

The Chinese state’s perception and treatment of Hui Muslims serves another curious purpose. It’s the kind of “positive capital” that stands in stark contrast to China’s relations with its Muslim Uyghur citizens in the neighboring Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

It is worth noting the historical differences between these two populations:

• The Hui are not tied to a single region and, unlike in Xinjiang, there is no history of separatist movements desiring a more independent Ningxia.

• Regional leaders in Ningxia (both Hui and Han) are more open-minded, politically enlightened, and less obsessed with political and ideological campaigns than their counterparts in Xinjiang. In general, Ningxia leaders are less obsessed with “fighting terrorism” and have better communications and connections with Beijing.

• The Hui are more culturally and racially tied to the Chinese. They are actively involved in modern Chinese nationalism, and see that as a way of ensuring the survival of Islam in the Chinese nation.

• The Uyghurs had two short-lived independent states, East Turkistan Republics respectively in 1930s and 1940s in Southern and Northern Xinjiang, which Xinjiang officials constantly perceive as precedent for today’s Uyghur human rights activities.

While the future looks bright for China-Hui relations in Ningxia, China-Uyghur relations have precipitously deteriorated into tension, hostility, and violence on both sides.

The forums in Ningxia have showcased and promoted China’s relationship with its Muslims, while China’s government in Xinjiang has attempted to de-Islamicize Uyghur Muslims there through restriction of Islamic practices — in hopes of containing and even eliminating Uyghur Muslim connections with their Central Asian neighbors.

Another trade initiative — the annual China-Eurasia Expo — was launched in Urumqi in Xinjiang in 2011 as an attempt to increase trade with China’s western neighbors in Central Asia, but organizers in this case downplayed the role of Xinjiang’s Turkic/Islamic cultural and religious ties with the region. This trade fair is jointly organized by China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Xinjiang government and Xinjiang Development and Construction Corps.

Given the tension and hostility between the Uyghurs and Xinjiang authorities and the Chinese government’s “Anti-Three (Evil) Forces” campaign (“separatism, extremism, and terrorism”), Uyghurs have found it difficult to participate in this government-organized trade fair. They are not encouraged to participate, probably out of China’s fear that they (the Uyghurs) will build closer relations with Central Asian Turkic states. Instead China has focused on encouraging the Han (ethnic Chinese) to engage in China-Central Asia communication.

As Ningxia’s utilization of Islam indicates, trade is not merely an exchange of goods, but also a communication of culture and emotion. China seems not to have considered that Uyghur participation in the China-Eurasia Expo would enrich the Uyhur community and greatly contribute to the projection of Chinese economic, as well as cultural, power in Central Asia.

Chinese officials should re-examine the Ningxia business model, which was endorsed by the Beijing government, and, ironically, initiated by a Ningxia government previously suspicious of Islam and Muslims. The success of the China-Arab States Expo proves that cultural tolerance and economic prosperity can be interconnected. And that, in the end, Islam turned out to be a selling point.

Ningxia and Xinjiang, Eurasian stops along the ancient Silk Road, should both be tied to the country’s strategic plan for the restoration of this historic trading route. (a long-range project the Chinese president Xi Jinping formally announced during his visit to Kazakhstan in early September 2013).

China is also promoting another project — the Trans-Asian Railway, or Eurasian Land Bridge, that would strengthen China’s economic ties with the West by connecting Asia and Central Asia with Europe.

What is lacking in both these initiatives, and China’s broader business strategy, is an acknowledgement by China that there could be positive benefits to come out of the Uyghurs’ historical, ethnic, cultural, and religious connections with Central Asia and their religious connections with the broader Muslim world. And that the Uyghurs could be seen as a source of peace and prosperity, as opposed to instability.

China’s No. 3 national leader Yu Zhengsheng said the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region lies at the crossroads between China and the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and Europe, and that it should play a more important role in Sino-Arab cooperation.

If the China-Arab Expo can bridge differences between China and the Arab and Muslim countries it does business with, and achieve prosperity for all, then there’s no reason to exclude Uyghur participation in the China-Eurasia Expo, Silk Road project, and China’s broader economic outreach to Muslim countries.

It can only increase China’s prosperity and improve China’s relations with Uyghur Muslims as well as the Muslim World

Posted: 2014年03月12日 in Original Thoughts

Is the existence of Uyghur Muslims under threat in China?http://islamicommentary.org/2014/03/watch-is-the-existence-of-uyghur-muslims-under-threat-in-china/

Analysis: Is the existence of Uyghur Muslims under threat in China? March 10, 2014 (Part 1) A knife attack by 8 assailants left 29 dead at a train station in South West China last month. It is an event that is likely to have serious implications for Chinese Uighur Muslims. The Chinese authorities have blamed the terror attack on Uihgur separatists from the Xianjing region.

This may pave the way for even greater restrictions on the Uighur population. They are already routinely subjected to strict security checks. The arrest of prominent academic Ilham Tohti last month under charges of fomenting separatism has been condemned by the international community. So what is behind the repressive actions of the Chinese government? And are the Uighur’s really a threat to Chinese state security?

Here to discuss this is host John Rees, and in the studio is Enver Tohti Bugda, Independent Researcher, Rod Wye, Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House and on Skype is Nicholas Bequelin, Senior researcher, from Human Rights Watch.

Welcome back to Analysis segment two, where we are talking about the latest measures taken against Uighur Muslims by the Chinese government.

Protests and riots in China’s autonomous Xianjing province in recent years have shown the growing discontent of native Uighur Muslims.

Migration into North Western region, coupled with increasingly repressive policies against Uighurs, has meant that they are now a declining proportion of the population.

So are we seeing the beginning of the end of Uighur Muslims in China?

Host is John Rees. Studio guests are Enver Tohti Bugda, Independent Researcher, Rod Wye, Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House. Via Skype is Dr. Haiyun Ma, from the Department of History at Frostburg State University in the U.S.